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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite safety measures that have been put in place since the mass school 
shootings at Columbine High School and Sandy Hook Elementary School, school 
districts are still ill prepared for an active shooter crisis. In this qualitative, exploratory 
study, four Texas superintendents of differing district sizes were interviewed. 
Information from the interviews was triangulated using school district policy, financial 
records, and emergency operations plans to gain an understanding of the overarching 
question: To what extent are schools prepared to address intruders and active shooters 
through the four stages of crisis planning? 
Through the research conducted, the four areas of crisis planning were analyzed: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. While school districts are required to 
have an emergency operations plan, these plans are not monitored outside the school 
district. Thus, each district has different priorities, and the majority of the plans address 
neither the recovery phase nor the possibility of active shooters. Concerns raised through 
the interview process include the lack of inclusion of first responders in the planning 
process and multijurisdictional issues faced by many districts. A thorough review of 
policy reveals insignificant requirements by the state for keeping staff and students safe, 
and an analysis of financial records highlights the disadvantage experienced by smaller 
districts due to lack of equitable funding from the state. This inequity affords larger 
districts the option to be better equipped with safety and security measures, as well as 
hiring of security personnel.  
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Safety in schools is of utmost importance—mass shootings are occurring across 
the country, and our schools must prepare for the real crisis of an active shooter. 
Upgrading security, revamping policy, and achieving equitable financing are essential 
elements to improve security and safety. Recommendations for future research target 
teachers as first responders, policy change, multijurisdictional ideas for handling 
emergency personnel, and the finances of rural school districts. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Background 
In the United States, approximately 55 million students attend public and private 
schools, and a primary expectation is for school districts to keep these students safe 
(Zhang et al., 2016). Ensuring safety for elementary and secondary school students, 
educators, administrators, and others is essential (United States Department of Justice, 
2013). Chris Murphy, Democratic Senator for Connecticut, where Sandy Hook 
Elementary School is located, said in a statement on the Senate floor, “No parent should 
have to fear for the life of their child when they drop them off at school.” Instead, there 
should be a sense of security—that their children will be safe. After the tragedies at both 
Columbine High School and Sandy Hook Elementary School, news reports were 
abundant as the public looked to investigate what could have been done to prevent the 
loss of life. As history shows, the loss of life tends to be an antecedent to more security 
measures and a higher sense of preparedness.  
One example of a higher sense of preparedness is related to fire safety in schools. 
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, deaths related to fires in 
schools are almost nonexistent (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2014). New 
processes, fire safety codes, and laws have been enacted that have curbed the loss of life 
in schools due to fire. While fires still occur, the preparedness of the school, staff, and 
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students, along with stricter fire safety codes, have made negligible the loss of life due to 
a school fire.  
While fire safety has evolved, schools are still working to catch up with the 
measurements needed in regard to school shooting crises. Looking back in history, the 
first mass school shooting in the United States occurred on August 1, 1966, at the 
University of Texas at Austin when a sniper in a bell tower killed 16 people and 
wounded 32 others (Texas Governor’s Committee and Consultants, 1966). Almost 50 
years later, lawmakers, school leaders, parents, and staff are still looking for answers. 
The mass shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado, where 13 students were 
killed in 1999, and Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, which took the lives 
of 27 children and school employees in 2012, are still a fresh reminder of a very real 
crisis that school districts face and for which they must be prepared (United States 
Department of Justice, 2013). Everytown for Gun Safety, a nonpartisan, nonprofit 
group dedicated to “understanding and reducing gun violence in America,” keeps track 
of school shooting numbers and puts the current total at 160 school shootings since 
2013, or an average of one per week.  
Statement of the Problem 
Research conducted in Rhode Island found crisis plans to be lacking in the area 
of preparation, including coordinating with area law enforcement, fire, and emergency 
personnel (Dube, 2012). Likewise, a study conducted in Massachusetts found research 
lacking in the area of crisis planning, with information sharing of best practices being 
almost nonexistent (Goldman, 2008). A joint report by researchers from the United 
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States Secret Service and Department of Education identified 37 incidents of targeted 
school violence occurring in the United States from 1974 to June 2000 (U.S. Secret 
Service & U.S. Department of Education, 2006). Almost half of the incidents lasted 15 
minutes or less from beginning to end of the shooting, while 25% of the incidents took 
place within just five minutes (U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, 
2006). The majority of these incidents were not stopped by law enforcement, a point that 
emphasizes how brief these incidents are in duration and why the schools themselves 
need to be prepared as first responders.  
When reviewing the Cycle of Crisis Planning from the United States Department 
of Education, little research exists that includes all four areas of crisis planning. 
Donaghey (2013) found through his research that while schools tend to focus on 
recovery, they lack in their focus on prevention and mitigation. Others believe the 
response of the schools is an area of concern due to the top-down approach from state 
mandates (Pagliocca & Nickerson, 2001; U.S. Department of Education, 2006). Since 
school shooting incidents have lasted 15 minutes or less on average, it is critical for 
school personnel to be prepared to respond while waiting for professional first 
responders to arrive.  
A lack of research looking at actual crisis plans and their implementation 
becomes no longer acceptable with 160 school shootings since 2013—this is not a 
problem that is going away (Secret Service & Department of Education, 2004). Most 
incidents do not receive the type of public attention given to Sandy Hook or Columbine, 
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but shootings at schools are nonetheless increasing (Zadrozny, 2013). Preparedness of 
schools needs to increase as well. 
Preparedness of the school includes not only the crisis plan but the 
implementation of the plan and recovery after implementation. Often, it is not the police 
who stop the violence on the campus, but instead the teacher or principal (Secret Service 
& Department of Education, 2006). One key finding of the Safe Schools Initiative is that 
even with prompt law enforcement response, most attacks have been stopped by means 
other than law enforcement (Secret Service & Department of Education, 2006). The 
implication for school districts relies on the importance of developing preventive 
measures, putting in place emergency plans, and including protocols and procedures 
(Erickson, 2001; Blair & Schweit, 2014). 
After analyzing 160 incidents, Special Agent Katherine Schweit, head of the FBI 
Active Shooter Initiative, concluded that there is a need not only for preparedness but 
training of staff. (Blair & Schweit, 2014). After the shootings at Columbine High 
School, safety measures were adjusted, and first responder training was implemented 
across the nation (Erickson, 2001; Fein et al., 2002). Incidentally at Sandy Hook, safety 
measures were in place and first responders arrived quickly, which plagues the country 
with the question: What else can be done to keep students and staff safe?  
Unfortunately, there is nothing currently in place to completely prevent these 
shootings, but the preparedness of the campus and staff can keep the loss of life to 
“negligible loss,” or the least possible number of lives lost. The United States 
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Department of Education (2007) believes that crisis preparedness is effective when 
schools prepare according to mitigation, preparation, planning, and recovery. 
Purpose of the Study 
 While many school shootings have occurred, there is little research on school 
shootings from the perspective of school district crisis plans. The majority of research 
discusses the “why” of the crisis or the shooter’s mental state as opposed to how to 
better prepare (Orcutt et al., 2014; Nickerson & Martens, 2008; Riley & McDaniel, 
1998). Negligible loss is still too many lost lives, so how do our schools react in a crisis? 
The intent of this study was to examine the perspective of school superintendents in 
Texas in regard to crisis preparation. This exploratory case study unveils information to 
gauge perceptions of preparedness among superintendents within their own school 
districts. Interviews were conducted on a sampling of Texas superintendents regarding 
safety and security measures in Texas school districts. These data were triangulated with 
financial records, emergency operations plans (EOPs), and policy from both the state 
and district. As stated in Texas Education Code (TEC) §37.108, all schools are required 
to have a crisis plan; however,  not all schools have the same preparedness for a crisis, 
nor do they all follow the four stages of mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery 
(US Department of Education, 2007; Dwyer et al., 1998). Using these four stages, the 
human component can also be a factor; the best crisis plan may not deter the loss of life 
if there is not enough training of staff. Another element addressed is the idea that not all 
schools are funded the same, resulting in financial constraints placed on schools that 
may prevent a district from affording the latest security advances.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 This exploratory study used the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) of policy 
change as the theoretical framework. This theory is based on the idea that school 
systems, which are considered bureaucracies, exist in an extended period of stasis, with 
changes occurring due to sudden shifts in radical change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  
While PET can take on different aspects, organizational information processing was 
used for the purpose of this study. Policies for schools are created through governmental 
organizations or local school boards by acting on information supplied. According to 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), changes to policy are often not proportionate to the 
amount of information provided. Policymaking alternates between under- and 
overreaction to the provided information (Jones & Baumgartner 2005; Wood & Peake 
1998). Overreaction to information could come from one event that shows a failure 
within a school system or an accumulation of problems over a period of time (Birkland 
& Lawrence, 2009). Within this framework, how a school system allocates attention to 
the problem is equally critical to how policymakers respond to the information. 
 Applying this idea of overreaction, school systems across Texas reacted to 
Columbine and then again to the shooting at Sandy Hook. Whether the reactions were 
warranted or considered overreactions depends on the school district. After Columbine, 
many safety measures were put in place that strengthened school security and improved 
response time for first responders. For example, no longer do police wait outside the 
school if there is a shooting; they immediately enter the building. (Columbine Review 
Commission, 2001; United States Secret Service & United States Department of 
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Education, 2004). After the Sandy Hook incident, many rural districts engaged in 
overreaction with allowing teachers to carry concealed handguns, and others spent 
money on entrance security and training more school resource officers (SROs). The 
missing elements from the research on the Columbine and Sandy Hook shootings are 
how each district addressed their EOP and their collaborative efforts to work with first 
responders. 
Research Questions 
Through a case study, the following research questions were used to gain an 
understanding of the factors that can help or hinder our schools in a crisis situation. The 
overarching question is as follows: To what extent are schools prepared to address 
intruders and active shooters through the four stages of crisis planning? This study 
looked specifically at the following inquiries in relation to the overarching question: 
 What are the school district superintendent perceptions about their district's 
preparation for crisis? (Mitigation) 
 What are the school district superintendent perceptions regarding their school 
district's efforts and measures to reduce or eliminate risk to life and property? 
(Preparedness) 
 What are the school district superintendent perceptions of their district's ability 
and capacity to respond to an emergency situation? (Response) 
 What are the school district superintendent perceptions about restoring the 
learning environment and evaluating the phases of the crisis plan? (Recovery) 
8 
Definition of Terms 
This section defines terms that are important to know for understanding this study. 
Emergency Operations Plan (EOP): a plan put forth by school districts that 
addresses before, during, and after a crisis situation. 
First Responder: emergency service personnel who are the first to arrive and 
assist at the scene of an emergency. 
Mitigation/Prevention: what schools and districts can do to reduce or eliminate 
risk to life and property. 
Negligible Loss: the least possible number of lives lost. 
Preparedness: the process of planning for a crisis. 
Recovery: the steps to restore the learning environment after a crisis and the 
evaluation of all phases for continuous improvement. 
Response: the steps taken during an emergency situation. 
Urbanicity: a school’s rural/urban setting. 
Procedures 
This case study collected data from four superintendents in Texas school districts 
through an interview process in order to explore the process of crisis preparedness plans. 
The parts of each plan were categorized into the four areas of mitigation/prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. The interview questions were generated based on 
the research question topics of preparedness and crisis plans. These open-ended 
questions generated detailed responses that provided the researcher with a better 
understanding of school preparedness within the school setting, as well as highlighting 
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common themes. Documents covering the district financials and EOPs were gathered 
from each district and compared to the documentation of the interview questions. 
Policies from the state and each district were analyzed to allow the researcher to look at 
the broader picture. Once all data were collected, a triangulation of reported data 
occurred in order for the researcher to look for common themes among all the districts. 
Significance of the Study 
In a news conference, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Democrat from 
California, said that after each mass shooting, a moment of silence is held in Congress. 
“We’re almost unworthy of that tradition to think a moment of silence should make us 
feel better,” Pelosi said. “We don’t need a moment of silence. We need a day of action” 
(ABC News, 2013). The action must be preparedness. According to TEC §37.108, all 
school districts in Texas are required to have a crisis plan in place. Often, the problem is 
not if the district has the plan, but if the plan addresses the components of mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery (United States Department of Education, 2007). 
While there is no quick fix for improving campus safety, one key component is 
monitoring the environment (Zdziarski et al., 2007). Not preparing appropriately for a 
crisis could not only have the impact of loss of life, but could bring legal ramifications as 
well (Brock, et al., 2009; Peterson & Straub, 1992). According to Trump, “Parents will 
forgive boards and administrators if student test scores go down for a year. Parents will 
not be so forgiving if students are injured or die in a tragedy that could have been 
prevented or better managed by school leaders” (National School Boards Association, 
2008). 
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A report of school safety–related laws passed in 2013 legislative sessions showed 
14 bills addressing school safety plan refinement (Education Commission of the States, 
2013). Some of the changes include requiring schools to review and update safety plans 
regularly, to coordinate with local law enforcement agencies, and to give copies of 
school safety plans to local first responders (Education Commission of the States, 2013; 
Education Code 37.108(a), (c-2)–(d); Texas Association of School Board Policy, 2015) 
Often an attitude of “that won’t happen here” overshadows the need to revamp 
the level of crisis preparedness. The significance of this study is to provide Texas school 
district superintendents with information indicating the level of crisis preparedness in 
their districts for the end goal of maintaining a safe learning environment. Digging 
deeper into districts’ crisis preparedness provides information and suggestions for 
implementation of stronger safety and security. At a time in education when results are 
crucial, when state aid is declining, and when accountability is at the forefront, school 
districts cannot lose sight of the basic need of safety. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter One begins with background 
information on the lack of crisis preparedness in school settings, which leads to the 
statement of the problem and the purpose of the study, the theoretical framework used in 
the study, research questions, definition of terms, and the procedures followed. Chapter 
One concludes with the significance of the study and the overall organization of the 
record of study. Chapter Two is the literature review comprising the following topics: 
overview, policy, funding, crisis preparedness/management, school reactions, 
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perceptions of safety, safety measures, theoretical framework, and a conclusion. Chapter 
Three explains the methodology of the study. Chapter Four presents the findings of the 
qualitative data analysis, and Chapter Five is a discussion of conclusions and 
recommendations for future studies.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview 
 A literature review is “a vital component of the research process that integrates, 
synthesizes, and critiques the important thinking and research on a particular topic” 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 1998, p.66). This review provides an important purpose for this 
research. According to Gall, et al., (2007), the literature review helps the researcher limit 
the scope of the study; allows the researcher the opportunity for new insight; focuses the 
researcher in order to avoid repeating research; gives the researcher information to 
design the study; and gives recommendations for future research. Maxwell (2005) 
argued that a literature review provides justification, guides the research, is a data source 
for testing theories, and provides a framework from which to work. 
 This chapter is a review of the literature in regard to the topic of school crisis 
preparedness. The organization of this chapter is by the following sections: background, 
policy, funding, crisis preparedness/management, school reactions, perceptions of safety, 
security measures, and theoretical framework. 
Background 
In 1966, the Austin Police Department did not have the equipment to respond to 
the crisis at the University of Texas bell tower. Police officers carried revolvers and 
shotguns, there were few radios, and at this time there was no specialized unit to respond 
to an active sniper (Cawthorne, 2007). Very little information is available from this 
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period of time that would allow schools to learn from mistakes or make adjustments to 
processes. 
The availability of information on Columbine High School and Sandy Hook 
Elementary School allows for a deeper understanding of school preparedness. The 
Governor of Colorado created the Columbine Review Commission to conduct an 
independent review of the April 20, 1999 incident. William H. Erickson, former Chief 
Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, chaired the commission. After a year of public 
hearings and examining thousands of documents, the final report was completed 
(Columbine Review Commission, 2001). According to the Columbine Review 
Commission (2001), the assault by two teenagers lasted 47 minutes, and another few 
hours passed before police or emergency personnel entered the building. The following 
recommendations were made to address the concerns of emergency preparedness: law 
enforcement should be trained that upon arriving at a scene of an active shooter, their 
highest priority is stopping the assault; an incident command must be put in place with 
prior training on large-scale emergencies; a digital trunked communication system is 
needed in order for all responding agencies to communicate; a major critical response 
plan must be in place for all agencies specifically for handling a school crisis; multi-
agency planning sessions should occur to plan for worst-case scenarios; and every 
school should have emergency crisis plans, school emergency kits, and scheduled crisis 
drills at least once a year.  
After the shooting at Sandy Hook, Connecticut Governor Dannell Malloy created 
a committee chaired by Mayor Scott D. Jackson of Hamden. The Sandy Hook Advisory 
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Commission was a 16-member panel of experts tasked to review current policy and 
make specific recommendations in the areas of public safety. Areas to address included 
school safety, mental health, and gun violence prevention (Sandy Hook Advisory 
Commission, 2015). The final report included 12 recommendations. Some of the 
recommendations are basic, easy-to-implement ideas such as classroom doors being 
locked from the inside, all exterior doors having lockdown capabilities, a plan to decide 
how to handle substitute teachers and classroom keys, and including auxiliary staff such 
as school custodians in the discussion of school safety. However, some of the 
recommendations require processes put in place that school districts may not be able to 
accomplish as easily. These recommendations include creation of a school safety and 
security committee to ensure implementation of Safe School Design and Operation 
strategies (Homeland Security, 2012); an architect on the school safety infrastructure 
council; named safety and security wardens; classrooms located away from school 
entrances; and rooms holding fewer people located closer to school entry points (Sandy 
Hook Advisory Commission, 2015). The final two recommendations also require two 
locations within the school to contain all emergency contact information for students and 
staff, as well as safety and security training for faculty, staff, and students on how to 
respond to hazards and/or events (Connecticut Department of Emergency Services, 
2014). 
Another report detailing the incident at Sandy Hook from the perspective of law 
enforcement was prepared by the State Attorney General’s Office of Connecticut. 
According to Article IV, Sec. 27 of the Connecticut State Constitution, the State 
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Attorney’s Office is charged with the investigation and prosecution of all criminal 
offenses (Connecticut Constitution Article 4, §27). While there is nothing in statute that 
requires a written report, due to the seriousness of the crimes committed on December 
14, 2012, the State Attorney’s Office published a report (Sedensky, 2013). The 
difference in the State Attorney report compared to the Sandy Hook Advisory 
Commission report is that the advisory commission provided recommendations while 
the State Attorney just related the detailed facts. 
As detailed in the State Attorney report (Sedensky, 2013), the following safety 
measures or procedures were already in place at Sandy Hook Elementary: the front doors 
were locked and secured with an electronic locking mechanism; a call box was outside 
the front door including a buzzer system and video camera; the office staff could view 
the live video and unlock the front door with a button; the office staff went into crisis 
mode by hiding; the school was notified over the intercom of the intruder; 911 was 
called; in two separate classrooms students and teachers retreated to a bathroom and 
locked the door; other classrooms close to the shootings remained silent and hid; 
students in classrooms farther away were able to escape the building; and one staff 
member stayed on the phone in the hallway with 911 while directing staff to safety 
(Sedensky, 2013; Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015).  
Police response time was less than six minutes from the first phone call placed to 
the time the first police officers entered the building (Connecticut Police Chief 
Association, 2013). Within those six minutes, the shooter had already taken his life upon 
their entrance, along with 27 others. The only part of the investigation that led to the 
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conclusion that more lives could have been saved reported that the two classrooms 
entered by the shooter were both unlocked and required no forced entry. Both doors had 
to be locked with a key from the hallway (Sedensky, 2013). This knowledge begs the 
question: Would the loss of life have been so high if the doors were locked prior to the 
shooter entering the building? 
In summation, the Sandy Hook reports from the State Attorney General’s Office 
of Connecticut and the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission show proof of many safety 
procedures in place; yet, there was still a significant loss of life. This study examines, 
through interviews of area superintendents, a more detailed look at school preparedness 
related to active shooters and safety plans.  
Policy 
Although there are no federal laws requiring schools to have EOPs, the Safe and 
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, as amended by No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB), directs that schools must have a plan promoting school safety (United States 
Code 20 §7161:3:B, 2007). Additionally, the State of Texas has put forth a policy to 
address safety in Texas schools. The TEC requires school districts to address mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery through adoption and implementation of a 
multihazard EOP as defined by the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (TEC §§ 
37.108).  
Districts are tasked with providing training to address emergency situations. 
Conducting security audits and holding safety drills are also expected, as is cooperative 
work with local emergency management agencies, law enforcement, and fire 
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departments. Other requirements of this mandated policy require districts to establish a 
committee to address school safety and security (TEC §§ 37.109), and a security audit of 
the district’s facilities must be completed every three years, with the results of the audit 
reported to the district school board and to the Texas School Safety Center. While the 
actual plan must remain confidential in order to keep the district secure, a school district 
must provide written documentation verifying the following: the district has an 
appropriate EOP that has been reviewed in the last 12 months; district employees have 
received training in responding to emergencies; the district conducts school drills and 
has completed a safety and security audit; and the district has established a visitor policy 
governing building access, among other things (TEC §§ 37.108). Using information 
from the TEC, Texas school boards “adopt policies that inform district actions” (Texas 
Association of School Board Policy, 2015). 
Funding 
TEC policy is considered a mandate according to McDonnell and Elmore (1987). 
In order to address the assurances of safety in schools, the rules are governed by the 
state. Mandates require compliance and enforcement with the rules set forth (McDonnell 
& Elmore, 1987). Cost factors of TEC §§ 37 include salary increases due to increased 
workloads or hiring of personnel, cost for employee training, and cost for appropriate 
equipment or services. Because these costs are considered compliance costs, school 
districts are held accountable (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). Federal grants provide 
funding for some security measures, but grant money for the Department of Education's 
Safe and Drug-Free Schools program was cut by 33% between 1999 and 2008. Further 
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cuts came from the United States Department of Justice, which has placed about 6,300 
police officers in public schools since Columbine. This program was discontinued in 
2005, according to Ray, a spokesman for the department (CNN, 2009). One concern with 
safety preparedness costs falling to the school district is the fact that mandates are 
required regardless of a district’s financial abilities. Varied results will exist, with some 
districts providing the minimum safety measures to comply and others providing a more 
comprehensive plan. Ensuring compliance from all districts requires that the policy 
mandate be put into effect (McDonnell & Elmore, 1987).  
Even as this policy is mandated, school districts have the opportunity to address 
public concerns surrounding safety. Publicizing to the community the requirement of a 
safety plan for each school, upgrading existing security measures, and completing drills 
with students and staff provide high visibility, yet low controversy for the district (Hess, 
1999). Controversy remains low because all stakeholders want to keep students safe at 
school. The Texas Education Agency mandates requiring safety measures in place, a 
safety plan, and training staff and students benefit everyone by providing a safe school 
environment. 
Crisis Preparedness/Management 
The actual practice of the policy put in place is revealed when schools are 
evaluated after a crisis situation. McLaughlin (1991) stated that the implementation stage 
of a policy is where success lies. It is the people who interpret and implement the policy 
who make the difference in a crisis situation. In 1991, Gaustad published a report titled 
Schools Respond to Gangs and Violence, in which she wrote, “Every school and district 
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should prepare for the possibility of a crisis. Not only will a plan help a school survive a 
crisis, but the very existence of a plan helps to protect the school from legal liability” (p. 
36). 
Through extensive interviews and reviews of crisis situations, the Practical 
Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities was created by 
the United States Department of Education (2007). The research revealed four phases of 
crisis planning called the Cycle of Crisis Planning (see Figure 1). The four phases 
consist of mitigation or prevention, which addresses steps for schools to reduce or 
eliminate risk; preparedness, the process of planning for a crisis; response, the steps to 
take during the actual crisis; and recovery, the steps to take after the crisis is over (US 
Department of Education, 2007). These steps for creating a high-quality EOP were 
provided to school districts by the White House in June 2013 (Department of Education, 
2013) in the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans 
(School Guide), the first joint product of the United States Department of Education and 
Department of Justice led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security led 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Health and Human Services 
(Department of Education, 2013). 
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Figure 1. Cycle of Crisis Planning. Adapted from United States Department of 
Education (2007).
Using the United States Department of Education (2007) Cycle of Crisis 
Planning, many studies and/or reports have pointed to a lack of preparation and 
readiness in addressing active shooters in schools. Graham et al. (2006) reported a lack 
of crisis preparedness for incidents involving mass casualties, even seven years after the 
Columbine shooting in Colorado. Subsequent studies have cited problems with school 
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safety,  lack of preparation, and overall management of a crisis for specific districts 
including Los Angeles County (Kano et al., 2007), Massachusetts (Goldman, 2008), and 
Idaho (Safe and secure schools assessment, 2008). 
After the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) 
shooting that killed 32 and injured 13 on April 16, 2007, a state review panel found the 
administration of Virginia Tech and the campus police force at fault in several areas of 
crisis management (Report of the review panel, 2007). Other problems cited included a 
study by the United States Government Accountability Office, which reported problems 
nationwide in the areas of lack of training, equipment, and preparedness in crisis 
situations (Ashby, 2007). After the release of this report, according to Thompson (2007), 
Congressional criticism of Homeland Security also ensued in the area of federal 
emergency management efforts. The only report to dispute all the others was authored 
by three members of the President’s cabinet stating that many of the nation’s schools are 
prepared for a crisis (Leavitt et al., 2007). 
After the Columbine shootings, some states started requiring schools to prepare 
for school shootings with lockdown drills, much in the way they prepare for fires or 
other disasters. According to a survey of school administrators funded by the American 
Association of School Administrators, these types of drills are now practiced routinely in 
nearly three-quarters of schools (Associated Press, 2005). A 2007 report from the 
National Center for Education Statistics and the Bureau of Justice Statistics showed that 
the number of in-school homicides dropped from 33 in the 1998-1999 school year to 13 
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in the 1999-2000 year, the year immediately following the Columbine shootings (Dinkes 
et al., 2009). 
While the tragedy at Columbine brought awareness to the issue of school safety, 
many experts believe that immediate attention has begun to wane in the last few years. 
In 2007, a hearing was held by the United States House Committee on Education and 
Labor. The topic was NCLB: Preventing Dropouts and Enhancing School Safety. 
Kenneth S. Trump, President and CEO of Nation School Safety and Security Services, 
Inc., testified at the hearing: 
Parents and educators are increasingly demanding that we not only do more, but 
do better, in improving safety in our educational climate. While many 
improvements in school safety, security, and emergency planning have been 
made in schools post-Columbine, the progress we saw in the months and years 
after that tragedy has been stalled and is slipping backwards in many school 
communities. (p. 3) 
Trump (2007) stressed that Congress needed to address three areas through new 
legislation: create oversight of school safety programming; restore previously cut 
funding and expand that funding for prevention, security, police, and emergency 
preparedness; and improve school crime reporting in order to have evidence-based data. 
The key is that schools must plan, prepare, and practice (Trump & Lavarello, 2000-
2006; U.S. Department of Education, 2007). 
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School Reactions 
Once an incident such as Columbine or Sandy Hook occurs, in which the lives of 
children are lost, schools immediately begin to increase school safety such as more 
security officers, metal detectors, cameras, and crisis protocol. According to Hawkins et 
al. (1998), our society is quick to jump to solutions. They believe that instead of adding 
more security measures, effective schools prevent violence through prosocial, 
cooperative behavior and a culture of learning (Hawkins et al., 1998). Creation of new 
policies is often a “kneejerk” reaction and is not evidence-based to understand the 
overall effectiveness of school preparedness (CNN, 2009; Allen et al., 2008).  
American Federation of Teachers President Randi Weingarten estimated that 
about 90% of districts have tightened security since the Sandy Hook shootings. Many 
schools now have updated school safety plans; more metal detectors, surveillance 
cameras, and fences; and ID badges and dress code requirements (Elkland et al., 2017; 
USA Today, 2013; Associated Press, 2014). Another push has been to hire more armed 
security personnel to protect staff and students. Mo Canady, Executive Director of the 
National Association of School Resource Officers, estimated a current count of about 
10,000 SROs in the United States. 
The summer after Sandy Hook, the National Association of School Resource 
Officers trained more than 2,000 law officers for schools, more than three times the 600 
who were trained the previous year. Another reaction to the shooting at Sandy Hook 
Elementary School is that many states or local governments approved the arming of 
school personnel to increase campus security (USA Today, 2013). At least 33 states took 
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this approach, introducing 80 bills in 2013 that would arm school teachers or staff. Bills 
authorizing the carrying of guns passed in eight states: Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas (Zadrozny, 2013). The difference at 
Sandy Hook that caused this reaction of arming staff was the age of children: previous 
shootings had happened at older levels, but this one proved that even the smallest 
children, those in elementary schools, are not safe; the realization was that every school 
is vulnerable, according Curtis Lavarello, Executive Director of the School Safety 
Advocacy Council (USA Today, 2013). 
Urbanicity 
Urbanicity has been used as a reason for violence in schools: shootings, drugs, 
fights and other criminal behaviors. This perception has proved false with the two mass 
school shootings at Columbine High School and Sandy Hook Elementary School. Both 
schools are located in “good” neighborhoods, yet two of the deadliest crimes were 
committed on these campuses. Overall, school violence is on the rise in both rural and 
suburban areas (Furlong & Morrison, 2001; Rintoul, 1998; Bowman, 2002). Violence in 
schools appears to mirror violence in the surrounding neighborhoods and in society as a 
whole, according to Bill Modzeleski, Federal Department of Education (Associated 
Press 2006; Hawkins et al., 1998). As an example, schools in urban areas where violence 
and crime rates are higher have higher rates of violence in the schools (Lichtenstein et 
al., 1994; Hawkins et al., 1998: Everett & Price, 1997; DeVoe et al., 2003). The opposite 
is also true: schools located in rural and suburban areas have lower rates of violence as 
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do the surrounding neighborhoods. The perception by parents and the community is that 
schools in these areas are safe (Hawkins et al., 1998).  
Not only is there a parent perception that rural and suburban areas are less likely 
to have violence in the schools, but teachers also believe that the schools in urban areas 
have much higher crime rates (Rintoul, 1998). This perception is based on preconceived 
notions that are false (Graveline, 2003). According to Furlong and Morrison (2001), 
rural areas report violence rates at 14.3% while urban areas have a 14.7% rate of 
violence. Turcotte (2006) found that while violence occurs in all types of schools, there 
are some differences in problems faced on campuses. Urban districts deal with more 
high-crime issues in surrounding neighborhoods, with students lacking in social 
development and a diverse population that is often poor. Rural or suburban schools, on 
the other hand, have issues more related to a lack of quality healthcare, substance abuse, 
and parents dealing with high unemployment rates (Turcotte, 2006). In a study by Siaosi 
(2006), it was found that the areas of commonality between urban and other districts in 
relation to high numbers of violent incidents are schools with large numbers of students 
receiving special education services and large numbers of students on the federal 
free/reduced lunch program.   
 Besides the actual neighborhoods, demographics also come into play, according 
to a study by the National Center for Education Statistics. Because the crime rate is 
higher in urban areas where there is a higher population and typically less affluent and 
more minority students, it was found that “Black students were more likely to report 
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having experienced any form of victimization than were White or Hispanic students” 
(DeVoe et al., 2003).  
At one time, heightened security in schools only occurred in urban school 
districts, but in the late 1990s and early 2000s, security in all schools began to increase 
(Addington, 2009). According to Addington (2009), in a span of four years (1999 to 
2003), security personnel in schools increased from 59 to 74%, security camera use 
increased from 39 to 58%, and locked school doors increased from 39 to 53%. While 
security is on the rise at schools, there is little research addressing the differences in 
campuses that have high security versus those with lower security. Nickerson and Spears 
(2007) researched the characteristics of schools that use authoritarian behavior 
management as opposed to educational/therapeutic behavior management. They found 
that the use of security personnel and metal detectors are authoritarian practices used 
primarily in large schools with a higher percentage of students receiving free/reduced 
lunch (Nickerson & Spears, 2007). Neither urbanicity nor the level of neighborhood 
crime related to the level of security was addressed in their research. Violence in schools 
has been a concern in the past, but the types of crimes are becoming more severe, 
prompting a White House conference in 2006 to discuss the increasing number of violent 
incidents occurring in public schools. This conference produced a preparedness guide to 
help schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2006), realizing that regardless of the 
location or size of a school, all schools need to be prepared for a crisis situation. 
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Perceptions of Safety 
In a survey conducted after the Columbine shooting, over half of the parents in 
the study surveyed feared for their child’s safety at school (Carroll, 2007). According to 
Addington (2009), increasing school security measures after Columbine was a large-
scale effort to reassure parents of their children’s safety at school.  
While there is limited research on the perception of teachers, the existing 
research tends to be more directed on training. The National School Safety and Security 
Services organization trains schools on how to handle acts of violence using assessments 
of school security, preparedness, and proactive safety (National School Safety and 
Security Services, 2005). Much research addresses the administrator role in a crisis 
situation; however, within the code of ethics for educators it is stated that an educator 
will make a constructive effort to protect the student from conditions detrimental to 
learning, health, or safety (Association of American Educators, 2014). 
Along with the educator’s code of ethics, administrators also have a moral, 
ethical, and legal responsibility to do their best to protect students and staff. A survey of 
school administrators showed that administrators believe increased security measures are 
effective in increasing student safety, the most common security measures being 
cameras, metal detectors, and security personnel (Garcia, 2003). While administrators 
and even parents are reassured regarding safety, the relationship between increasing 
security and student perceptions is different. Research suggests that student fears are 
heightened due to increased security. Two empirical studies address this issue. Schreck 
and Miller (2003) completed an analysis of the cross-sectional National Household 
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Education Survey: School Safety and Discipline report. Part of their findings showed that 
students are more afraid of metal detectors, causing worry regarding being a victim of 
assault, and that increased security personnel and locked doors cause worry about 
robbery, theft, and assault (Schreck & Miller, 2003). As the study indicated, all the 
effects of increased security hold that when statistically controlling for student 
demographics, urbanicity, and crime on campus, students have a fear of victimization 
(Schreck & Miller, 2003). The second study conducted by Bachman et al. (2010) was 
based on their investigation of the School Crime Supplement of the National Crime 
Victimization Survey. In this study, findings showed that metal detectors in schools are 
significantly related to increased fear in students. While most research does not 
distinguish among races in regard to fear of students, within this study, the use of 
security personnel in the school increased fear for white students but not for African-
American students (Bachman et al., 2010). 
Hyman and Snook (2000) supported the negative relationship between school 
security and student perceptions of safety. Practices such as unannounced locker 
searches, daily metal detector screenings, the use of police officers in schools, and the 
overall increased use of prison-like security measures in schools cause students to 
question the safety of their school (Hyman & Snook, 2000; Brooks et al., 2000; Bracy, 
2011). Overall research, in both theoretical and qualitative studies, supports the 
conclusion that student perception of safety in their schools decreases as security 
measures increase.  
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Security Measures 
 As school security is designed to reduce violence in schools, research offers the 
idea that increased security measures may have the opposite effect. Invading student 
privacy through strip searches, random locker searches, and consequences that are rooted 
in the policies of zero tolerance cause students to lose faith in school authority, to have 
feelings of anger, and potentially to harbor a desire for revenge (Hyman & Perone, 
1998).  
 A number of studies have been conducted looking at just one particular security 
measure in relation to students, but few assess the effects of the overall security 
measures in place. May et al. (2004) found that according to campus administrators, 
SROs have a positive influence on their schools through reducing altercations, drugs, 
and theft. McDevitt and Paniello (2005) also had positive results regarding SROs on 
campus from the view of the students, who reported favorable impressions of their 
school SRO. Reviewing seven studies on the use of metal detectors in schools, Hankin et 
al. (2011) found that the use of metal detectors to reduce violence shows limited 
effectiveness. Overall, their review showed one study with a 6% decrease in students 
carrying weapons, but no decrease in fighting. The other six studies showed no decrease 
in violent behaviors or weapons (Hankin et al., 2011). An ethnographic study of two 
high schools regarding overall security conducted by Bracy (2011) showed that students 
react more negatively to increased security measures. 
 Security measures such as security cameras, security personnel, locked doors, 
locker searches, and metal detectors actually perpetuate or increase school crime (Mayer 
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& Leone, 1999; Nickerson & Martens, 2008). In an effort to keep students safe, schools 
create a locked-down, jail-like atmosphere, which may result in an undesired effect. 
Theoretical Framework 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), through an analysis of policymaking cases, found 
that (1) policymaking, depending on public agenda, can become stagnate or make great 
strides; (2) punctuated equilibrium is dictated by political institutions; and (3) policy 
changes play a critical role in organizational changes. Sabatier (2007b) believed that 
while PET began with a concentration on national policy, it is used more frequently in 
relation to public policy. “This theory focuses on the interaction of political institutions, 
interest mobilizations, and boundedly rational decisionmaking” to affect policy (True et 
al., 2007, p. 158). In other words, according to Speth (2004), punctuated equilibrium 
through the analysis of information can lead to policy change or new policies. 
Chubb and Moe (1990) believed that a school organization’s capacity to change 
is limited by its’ bureaucratic ways. In their view, bureaucratization represents the 
addition of layers of management to schools. These new layers may include specialized 
directors or security personnel for a district. Each of these new layers adds a person who 
can stop change or a person who can slow down change. This results in school districts 
that are unable to respond to new challenges. As each policy works its way through these 
layers, the result is often an organization that is slow to respond. Organizations are 
slower to make the big changes and instead stick to incremental decisions until the 
pressure to change becomes more critical to them. The key to this theoretical perspective 
is to analyze the relationship between organizational characteristics and separate 
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incremental from nonincremental decision processes (Robinson, 2004). In essence, PET 
helps create a balance between information coming in and the policies or procedures in a 
school system. 
Conclusion 
 Through this literature review, the topics of policy, funding, crisis preparedness, 
crisis management, school reactions, urbanicity, perceptions of safety, security 
measures, and theoretical framework are discussed to provide a basis for the study. The 
research shows that violent crime in schools, while often underreported, are occurring 
(Hurst, 2005; Hevesi, 2006; Bucher & Manning, 2005). All schools, no matter the size, 
location, or ethnic makeup, need to have an EOP in place. No longer can the plan just 
address fire safety evacuation, but all areas of violence that could occur, while paying 
attention to the Cycle of Crisis Planning through mitigation or prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this case study is to examine the perspective of school districts in 
Texas in regard to crisis preparation. This study is based on qualitative data collected 
through interviews of four school district superintendents in the state of Texas. 
According to Merriam and Tisdell (1998), “there is no standard format for reporting case 
study research” (p.193). While there is no standard, this study’s overall structure is based 
on a combination of structures. Stake (2006) believed that using vignettes to draw the 
reader into the research provides a stronger description. Using this structure, themes, 
assertions, and interpretations are discovered. Similarly, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
believed in the stronger description of the problem while making sure the study focuses 
on elements studied and lessons learned. Finally, this study uses Yin’s (2003) single-
case holistic design to focus on crisis preparedness within schools while using 
Merriam’s and Tisdell’s (1998) idea of seeking to understand a process.  
When completing qualitative research, validity of the research is crucial. Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) adhered to the idea of member checking as “the most crucial technique 
for establishing credibility” (p. 314) in a study. These member checks consist of taking 
data and interpretations back to the participants in the study to confirm the credibility of 
the information (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), which, in the case of this research, allowed the 
interviewee to have an opportunity to correct errors or misinterpretations from the 
transcribed interview data.  
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Triangulation of data is another element of validity in qualitative research; it is a 
systematic process of sorting data to find common themes or categories. According to 
Cresswell and Miller (2009), data collected through observations, interviews, and 
documents allow the researcher to categorize. Validity comes into play as the researcher 
relies on multiple forms of data instead of one form. Therefore, this qualitative study 
used information gathered from area superintendents such as observations, interviews, 
and documents to focus on crisis preparedness and gauge a better understanding of the 
overall process and evaluation. 
Background 
  The United States Congress created a mandated policy to “collect, collate, 
analyze and report full and complete statistics on the condition of education in the 
United States; conduct and publish reports and specialized analyses of the meaning and 
significance of such statistics; assist state and local education agencies in improving 
their statistical systems; and review and report on education activities in foreign 
countries” (Tonsager et al., 2010, p. ii). Taking this to the state level, the TEC requires 
districts to complete audits once every three years. The process developed was a district 
self-assessment to analyze the safety and security of each district in the state of Texas. 
The aftermath of several school shootings since 1999 had school safety gaining 
national attention. While data on crime and safety had been collected for many years 
prior, the need to implement a tool to monitor the current safety and security of schools 
while providing feedback for improvement became an urgent necessity. The Texas 
School Safety Center was authorized by the 77th Texas Legislature in 2001 to serve as a 
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central location for the dissemination of information, focusing on the safety and security 
of healthy learning environments, including research, training, and technical assistance 
to public schools throughout the state. While the information gained from the Texas 
School Safety Center is important for school districts, it is very technical in nature and 
does not give the human side of crisis preparedness. Therefore, this study gathered 
qualitative information to allow superintendents the opportunity for a narrative approach. 
Research Design 
 Understanding that there are varying paradigms that allow researchers to gain 
information in different ways, the qualitative phase of this study is based on the 
Positivist approach, specifically the view of epistemology in relation to Positivism, 
which states that there is one and only one truth or probability of truth and holds the 
ontological understanding that reality is independent of experience. Positivist theories of 
truth believe that truth is knowable and universal throughout (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). 
The interview data collected are based on a representative sampling of public schools in 
Texas; these results could apply to a larger population in public schools across the state. 
Within the Positivist theory, since truth is universal, the representative sample provides 
an indication on how other schools in similar situations would respond to the same 
interview (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). Therefore, researching by examining the 
relationship among the schools allows for a qualitative case study based on the Positivist 
epistemological and ontological foundation. 
 Often, evaluation research is used to make judgments about the worth of 
educational programs, and school administrators are able to use the information 
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collected to make decisions that impact schools. According to Cohen et al. (2007), 
evaluation research is parochial since it focuses on a single entity, but it does examine 
multiple aspects of what is being studied—in this instance, school crisis preparedness. 
To address the parochialism, according to Joyner et al. (2013), an evaluation study needs 
to accomplish one or more of the following: 
Provides an early test of a new approach or model of evaluation, develops an 
instrument that can be used in other studies, evaluates a program that is widely 
used but has little systematic evaluation or documents how the evaluation results 
were used by groups of stakeholders. (p. 121) 
This study addresses Joyner’s (2013) evaluation study guideline of evaluating a program 
that is widely used, but has little systematic evaluation, specifically evaluating school 
crisis preparedness.  
Data Collection 
In order to look at multiple contributors of the crisis preparedness of a school 
district, data were collected from local and state policy, financial records, documents 
pertaining to the EOP, and answers to interview questions. The documents related to 
each school district’s financials and policies were collected from the school districts. The 
EOP was provided by each superintendent with the understanding that the documents 
would not be shared with the public due to confidentiality. 
The interview questions were created for four school district superintendents in 
Texas to gain a better understanding of the crisis preparedness within each district, as 
well as provide an evaluative component (see Appendix A) specifically addressing the 
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four components of crisis planning (see Figure 1). Open-ended questions allowed the 
interviewee to expand the answers related to funding, policies, training, and safety 
measures in order to explain how the topics apply to each specific school district.  
Participants 
 Texas school districts are divided into 20 regional service centers. Region XIII 
comprises 60 school districts located over 16 counties. The four school districts in the 
study are located within the same Central Texas region but in different counties. District 
A is located in Williamson County, District B is located in Lee County, District C is 
located in Burnet County, and District D is located in Bastrop County. Each school 
district is located within 25 to 55 miles from the same major metropolis.  
District size in Texas is classified as 1A, 2A, 3A, 4A, 5A, or 6A, with the study 
districts falling at 2A, 3A, 4A, and 5A. This University Interscholastic League (UIL) 
classification is based on the number of students at the high school and is reclassified 
every two years. A 6A district has each high school at or above 2,100 students, 5A has 
the high school population between 1,060 and 2,099, 4A high school population is 
between 465 and 1,059, 3A high school population is between 220 and 464, 2A high 
school population is between 105 and 219, and 1A has a high school population of 104.9 
and below. These numbers, for classification purposes, change every two years. 
Financially, the study districts are not the same except in the financial classification of 
the state. School districts in Texas are categorized as either Chapter 41 or Chapter 42. 
The Texas Education Agency labels any district exceeding the Tier 2 $319,500 equalized 
wealth level as Chapter 41. A district with a property wealth sufficiently below the 
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equalized wealth level is considered a Chapter 42 district (Texas Education Code, 2015). 
All districts in the scope of this study are currently under the Chapter 42 designation. 
 Table 1 shows a comparison of the four districts in the study. Areas of 
comparison include UIL classification, number of students per district, ethnicity 
breakdown of each district, and the socioeconomics of each district.  
 
Table 1 
 
District Comparison 
      Ethnicity   
 District UIL Students AA H W Eco Dis 
A 2A 420 2.40% 41.20% 54.30% 57.50% 
              
B 3A 944 8.70% 11.90% 75.60% 41.50% 
              
C  4A 3218 1.30% 29.20% 66.60% 56.50% 
              
D  5A 4178 12.80% 56.80% 27.50% 75.70% 
 
 
The superintendents completing the interview range from a first-year 
superintendent to one with six years’ experience. District A’s superintendent, while a 
small district administrator, stays very involved with the state legislature, is the Region 
XIII Texas Association of School Administrators Legislative Representative, and has 
testified multiple times during legislative sessions. He is the most experienced in the 
superintendent role of the others in this cohort, currently working on his doctorate and 
having been published in education journals. District B’s superintendent is finishing his 
first year in a 3A district. His career has been at the middle and high school levels, with 
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his previous position being that of a 4A high school principal. Superintendent B has his 
doctorate and is very involved in the Texas Association of School Administrators, as 
well as community organizations. Superintendent C has the most administrative 
experience. He has been at the administration level in two large school districts, with a 
previous position of deputy superintendent and four years as superintendent. He is a 
mentor superintendent for Texas Association of School Boards, he is very involved in 
community organizations, and his district was recognized as an HEB Excellence in 
Education district under his leadership. The final superintendent from District D has her 
doctorate. She has been in her position for five years. She too is heavily involved with 
the legislature in order to advocate for Texas schools. As with all the other 
superintendents, she is highly involved in the community. 
Procedures 
 The superintendent interview comprised 10 open-ended questions (see Appendix 
A). The questions asked of the superintendents were based on the research questions 
regarding crisis plans and the stages of crisis planning from the United States 
Department of Education (2006). These interview questions were created to gain a 
deeper understanding of how a school district would respond to a crisis and how it would 
respond after a crisis. 
 The questions addressed planning for both instructional and noninstructional 
facilities, the financial aspect in crisis funding, the four phases of emergency 
management in relation to a multihazard EOP, the training of emergency plans, and the 
community or organizations involved in the planning.  
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 Initially, permission was sought to include the school district in the research 
through an email to each district superintendent. A follow-up phone call explained the 
research project and gave background information. Each school district superintendent 
then sent a letter on district letterhead to inform the researcher of the intent of the school 
district to participate. Consent for the individual superintendent to participate was gained 
through a one-on-one conversation prior to the interview, with each superintendent 
signing a consent document.  
One week before the interviews, an email was sent including the interview 
questions in order to allow superintendents the opportunity to prepare. The interviews 
were conducted during the month of October 2016, with follow-up phone calls two to 
three weeks later to clarify information as needed. Interviews were conducted in person 
at the participants’ offices, with the conversations being digitally recorded for future 
reference. Notes were also taken during the process to provide information for follow-up 
questioning as needed.  
 In addition to conducting the interviews, the researcher analyzed each district’s 
crisis plan in order to assess the relevance in relation to the four stages of crisis planning. 
During the interviews, as information from the superintendents applied to the EOP, it 
was noted by the researcher for further analysis. These plans are not allowed to be 
published due to the security risk it would pose for the district.  
Preparation occurring prior to the interviews included an analysis of the financial 
records and policy, both state and local. Going into the interview with the financial 
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information and the policies in place for each district again allowed the researcher to 
make notes as the interviews transpired to address in the later analysis. 
Once the interviews were complete, all digital data were transcribed by the 
researcher using Dragon software and were sent to the individual participant for review. 
Participants were asked to correct any errors, add any clarifying information, and strike 
through anything they did not want published due to security concerns.  
Role of the Researcher 
 Recognizing the importance for the researcher in this exploratory study to have 
an understanding of school district policy, structures of the Texas public school systems, 
and situational factors of school districts, my current role as Superintendent of Schools 
affords me a solid knowledge base. There is acknowledgment that my current role may 
also provide a bias in how the researcher perceived an answer to a question, given the 
fact that my current day-to-day operations mirror those of the superintendents 
interviewed.  
 For the purpose of this study, conducting a case study allowed the researcher to 
focus on problems that school districts face in providing secure environments for staff 
and students. While a case study is a useful tool in conducting research in the education 
field, its key is the basis of building a relationship between the researcher and the 
interviewee (Shank, 2002; Creswell, 1998). At the time of study, the four 
superintendents interviewed were in the same education service center region as the 
researcher, providing the opportunity for combined meetings, casual conversations, and 
joint trainings. With this familiarity, the interviews transformed into a conversation that 
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put the superintendents at ease, thus allowing true reactions to be observed and included 
within the data analysis. Along these same lines, the familiarity opened the opportunity 
for a more frank discussion, as they each realized the commonality in dealing with the 
same type of concerns in emergency planning.  
Measures were taken to safeguard confidentiality of the districts according to 
TEC 37.108 (c-1), which states that safety and security audit information is not subject 
to disclosure. However, TEC 37.108 (c-2) states that certain exceptions regarding 
disclosure are permitted (TEC §§ 37.108). In order to apply the TEC to this study, 
portions of the EOPs are discussed within Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, but the entirety of 
the EOP is not included in the Appendices. 
Data Analysis 
This qualitative study used inductive reasoning processes to interpret and code 
the meanings from data. Inductive reasoning is referred to as a “bottom-up” approach, as 
observations are used to create the themes or commonalities of the data (Holloway, 
1997). Throughout this study, the researcher spent time learning as much as possible 
about the superintendents, the school districts, policy, the financial aspects of each 
district, and the EOPs. The triangulation of the verbal, written, and observed data 
allowed the researcher to delve into the comparison looking for differences and 
commonalities of the districts. Each set of data for the district was compared to the other 
districts looking for common patterns and themes. This constant comparative analysis 
strategy was developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Comparative analysis in the case 
of this research involved taking one piece of data, such as an open-ended answer to an 
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interview question, and comparing it to the same question answered by a different 
superintendent.  
With all of the information collected, the data were categorized within the 
following headings: Mitigation or Prevention, Preparedness, Planning, and Response. 
Each participant was assigned a different-color index card highlighting the main ideas. 
This research utilized Creswell’s (2007) method of coding as the basis for research. In 
order to assist in the coding, QDA Miner software was also used. Some themes were 
preconfigured using the four stages of preparedness, while other themes materialized 
once the information was obtained. The researcher then categorized the schools 
according to the collaborative preparedness efforts of each school district and the EOP of 
the district. Triangulating these data with financial records and policies related to crisis 
preparedness gave the researcher a more detailed understanding of the school districts in 
the study while evaluating the districts in relation to the four stages of crisis planning. 
Assumptions 
1. Throughout the interview process, the participants had firsthand knowledge of 
the scope of the study and were able to answer the questions asked. 
2.  The superintendents interviewed answered the questions honestly, as the crisis 
plans are used by school districts to improve their safety and security from year 
to year.  
3. The data were categorized and interpreted to reflect the true intent of the 
participants’ answers.  
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4. The references to crisis preparedness, specifically mitigation, preparation, 
planning, and recovery, for all participants had the same meaning. 
5. The design used in this research study was appropriate. 
Limitations 
1. The study was limited to four school superintendents in one region of Texas.  
2. The study was limited by the funding of their school districts from the State of 
Texas; we have to assume that funding is the same for all.  
3. This study was limited by each school district’s board of trustee’s specific 
agenda for the spending of funds. 
4. This research was limited to the information gathered from the interview 
questions and school district documentation.  
5. This research was limited by the varying size of the school districts and the 
location in relation to first responders.  
6. This research was limited by the perceptions of campus safety representing a 
snapshot at a specific point in time. A campus can change throughout the year in 
areas such as staffing, substitutes, construction, or the number of people on 
campus. 
7. This research was limited by the relationship the researcher had with the 
superintendent from District B and District C. District B superintendent was a 
member of the same graduate cohort, and District C was a supervisor and 
superintendent mentor for the researcher. 
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Conclusion 
In order to collect information to have a positive impact on school crisis 
preparedness, this study was completed to provide school districts more detailed 
information on how to provide the safest environment before, during, and after any crisis 
situation. Due to the researcher’s background knowledge of the superintendent position, 
as well as the collection of data prior to the interviews, a more in-depth understanding of 
the research occurred for the study. School district superintendents have a heavy burden 
placed on them, as they are tasked with the acts of preventing crisis, preparing for crisis 
whether man-made or naturally caused, planning and responding to crisis, and then 
recovering from crisis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Overview 
This chapter presents the findings and analysis of four Texas school districts in 
regard to crisis planning. The reporting of information from interviews, financial 
records, policy, and district EOP is organized by each school district. The interviews and 
EOP are also categorized by each research question, which are related to the four stages 
of crisis planning. Financial records for the past three years and the school district EOP 
were inspected for each district. Also analyzed were the policies for each district in 
regard to safety. After the inspection of the documents, the superintendent of schools 
was interviewed to discuss processes and procedures as they relate to the four areas of 
crisis planning: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.  
District C’s superintendent included his Emergency Management Coordinator in 
the interview to address anything he left out. The superintendent of schools for District 
D requested that her Director of Purchasing and Organizational Planning email notes to 
her regarding the research questions in an effort to address all areas. These two districts 
are the only two with a dedicated person for safety and security of the district.  
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District/City Information 
 The actual interview of each superintendent occurred in their respective districts. 
The superintendent of District A, which is a 2A district and the smallest district in this 
study, has an office located in the combined high school/middle school building. The 
drive to this district is approximately 35 miles to the northwest from the researcher’s 
home. The town comprises a main street with a few local businesses. One of the homes 
in this city was the location for filming The Texas Chainsaw Massacre. Other tourist 
attractions include a lake known for great fishing and a restaurant/dance hall frequented 
by people from the larger surrounding cities.  
All district buildings including the football field, bus barn, and maintenance area 
are located on the same adjoining property. The perception of the researcher is that the 
compactness of the district allows for quick response and help from all staff. In an 
evacuation scenario, buses could be available to evacuate students extremely quickly. 
Should a problem occur at the elementary school, the administrative staff of the middle 
school or high school are within 50 yards, as the buildings are connected by a walkway. 
 District B, the 3A school district, is located 20 miles to the south of the 
researcher’s home. Driving through this town to reach the administration building, the 
researcher noted that while it has more businesses than District A, the majority are 
locally owned (there is only one chain gas station). Located in the city is the Pioneer 
Village Museum dating back to the 1850s, as well as a huge replica of the city in the 
1940s located in one of the shops.  
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The school district has an administration building approximately 200 yards from 
the schools, which was the location of the interview. Three schools make up the district, 
and while all are in separate buildings, they are located on the same property attached to 
the sport fields and maintenance buildings. The researcher noticed that while the three 
schools are separated, they have common areas such as athletic fields, gyms, and a field 
house. In an emergency at one school, help from other schools could occur quickly due 
to the proximity. The openness of the land among the schools or buildings, however, 
could result in more serious concerns as students move freely between the schools. 
 The distance to District C, the 4A district, from the researcher’s house is 79 miles 
to the west. Located in the Highland Lakes area, the city is often visited for its historic 
town square with shops and restaurants. Known for its musical light display at Christmas 
and its Bluebonnet Festival in the spring, this city appeals to families and tourists.  
District C is unique in that it is a consolidated district. This district is 
consolidated with another small town located 10 miles to the east. One of the district’s 
elementary schools is located in this smaller town. All other schools are located in the 
larger town: a high school, middle school, three elementary schools, and an alternative 
school. Other buildings in the school district include an administration building and 
professional development building, along with a maintenance building, bus barn, and 
sport fields. This district is spread out over the city more than the first two districts 
discussed. Driving through this town, the researcher noticed multiple chain restaurants, a 
large chain grocery store, and many other businesses, along with a hospital. The 
distances between schools and administration buildings would create a longer wait time 
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to get help from other schools should any incidents occur. Another issue noticed driving 
through the city is that delays of first responders are possible due to traffic on the major 
highway. The researcher conducted the interview for this district in the professional 
development building because the administration building was in the process of being 
remodeled. Along with the superintendent, the Emergency Management Coordinator of 
the district was present. 
 The final district is a 5A district, which is the largest of those researched. District 
D is located 41 miles southwest from the researcher. This city is located on a major 
highway, with the city limits connecting to a large metropolitan area. Many restaurants, 
both local and chain-owned, shopping areas, and entertainment make up this city. 
Known as the Sausage Capital of Texas, this city has two large barbecue restaurants that 
are well known throughout the state. 
The school district has seven schools, an administration building, a sport 
complex, a maintenance building, and a bus barn. One difference in this district is that 
the district also houses a county juvenile boot camp for grades 7 to 12. The researcher 
noticed that the lack of proximity from one school to another, as well as the highly 
traveled highway through the city, could cause many concerns with wait time for a 
school in a crisis situation. This interview was completed in the administration building 
conference room with the superintendent and researcher. The superintendent did have 
notes provided by the Director of Purchasing and Organizational Planning.  
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City Statistics 
 In order to compare the location of the four districts, Table 2 provides 
information related to each city. District C is highlighted to show the two cities that 
make up the consolidated district. Looking specifically at a comparison of school 
population, city population, and school district square mileage, District D has a more 
dense population of students living inside the city limits, while Districts A and B have 
more students living outside the city limits. District C is the outlier due to the vast 
district boundary covering over 700 square miles. As the two districts were consolidated 
into one, both sets of boundaries were combined. Median income and poverty level 
remain fairly constant for all cities, and when comparing the poverty levels to the 
national average, which according to the United States Census Bureau is 13.5%, three of 
the cities have a higher poverty level and one is close to the national average (Proctor et 
al., 2016). Through a comparison of ethnic makeup, District D is the outlier. While 
Districts A, B, and C have closely related percentages, District D’s relation of white to 
nonwhite is more evenly distributed. The proximity of this district to a large 
metropolitan area has forced many minority families to move due to a revitalization of 
the major city. Housing prices have pushed many families to the outlying smaller 
communities. 
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Table 2 
City Statistics 
District 
School 
Population 
City 
Population 
District 
Size, sq. 
mi. 
% 
White 
% 
Nonwhite 
Median 
Income 
% Below 
Poverty 
Line 
A 420 1,419 98 82% 18% $32,542 12% 
B 944 1,282 291 80% 20% $32,083 15% 
C 3,218 
5,987 
707 
84% 16% $27,093 14% 
1,353 88% 12% $36,250 8% 
D 4,178 8,135 165 57% 43% $38,750 16% 
 
 
Policy Review 
 A review of policy for the four school districts allowed the researcher to gain an 
understanding of the legal requirements for the EOP. Two policies are required of school 
districts: CKC(LEGAL) and CK(LEGAL). Also noted was that all four districts have 
policy CKC(LOCAL). A legal policy provides statutory context through a combination 
of federal law, state law, and court decisions. A local policy is based on decisions made 
by the school board of the district.  
Looking specifically at CK(LEGAL), this policy titled TEC37.109 (see 
Appendix D), the sections within this policy include safety and security committee, 
safety and security audit, disclosure, and agreements. The first section takes the 
overarching multihazard EOP and breaks it down to specific campuses by requiring each 
to have an EOP consistent with the district plan. Each of the four districts within this 
research project has both a district plan and campus-specific information.  
The district must also submit an audit to the Texas School Safety Center every 
three years while also reviewing the reports submitted with district employees. As 
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discussed with the superintendents, this audit is purely based on the information 
provided from each school district. As there are no checks and balances of the 
information provided, there are concerns of honesty, true understanding of the questions 
asked, and detailed information, which could cause the school district to look bad to the 
public eye. Applying this to the current study, one of the assumptions for this study 
states the following: The superintendents interviewed answered the questions honestly, 
as the crisis plans are used by school districts to improve their safety and security from 
year to year. This assumption is also made for completion of audits. 
Section two explains the audit process, which must occur TEC 37.108(c-1). In 
order to keep districts safe, documents presented for the audit are not subject to 
disclosure as described in the disclosure section. An example of the lack of disclosure 
would include the evacuation plan for a campus. Applied to this current study, should 
disclosure occur, an active shooter could gather information prior to an incident, thus 
causing more damage or fatalities by knowing where students and staff have relocated. 
Finally, the section titled Agreements from TEC 37.2121 requires a district to 
provide information to the Texas School Safety Center if the district enters into a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) for mutual aid in an emergency situation. This 
part of the policy could address the concerns voiced regarding multijurisdiction, which 
one district discussed and is shown later in the analysis. In essence, a district located 
within two jurisdictions could create an MOU with the closest first responders to provide 
support for the entire district, thus decreasing the response time. CK(LEGAL) looks at 
the larger picture by reporting to a state agency and having legal agreements for possible 
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coordination of agencies, while CKC(LEGAL) applies to the inner workings of a school 
district in response to safety.                                                                                                                                                                                       
Analyzing CKC(LEGAL) (see Appendix B), titled Safety Program/Risk 
Management, an EOP has three headings: emergency operations plan, train derailment, 
and disclosure (Texas Association of School Boards, 2017). 
The section titled Emergency Operations Plan addresses the rules of adopting 
and implementing a multihazard plan. Stated are the requirements for addressing 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery while also providing for district 
employee training, drills, measures to ensure coordination with first responders, and 
implementation of a safety and security audit. 
The next section on train derailment is specific only to districts located within 
1,000 yards of a railroad track. Should the district meet that criterion, a plan must be 
included in the multihazard EOP. All four districts meet the 1,000-yard requirement, yet 
train derailment is outside the scope of this research and was therefore not discussed 
during the interviews.  
The final section in policy CKC(LEGAL) is disclosure. This section addresses 
Government Code Chapter 552 and has nine statements that a district must verify. All 
but two of these refer back to the EOP for the district. The two outliers are the safety 
audit and a visitor policy. Though listed in policy that a district must verify its audits, 
there is no agency in the state that monitors verification completion or even to what 
degree audits are completed. Again, the only information supplied is through the safety 
audit every three years, and that information is only as accurate as what the person 
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submitting it shares.  The first verification is that a district not only has a plan, but that 
coordination exists with outside agencies such as law enforcement, health department, 
and fire department. Ensuring that the plan is a fluid document, the second verification 
states that the plan must be reviewed yearly. The four phases of emergency management 
must be included, which is verification three. Requirements for training district 
personnel, determining the types of training, and conducting emergency drills are 
addressed in the fourth and fifth verification. Verification six is specific to train 
derailment and ensuring that a district includes a plan within the multihazard plan. Seven 
and eight address school board involvement; the safety and security audit results are 
presented to the school board, and the district addresses recommendations by the school 
board for improvement to the plan. The final verification relates to having a visitor 
policy for access to buildings (Education Code 37.108(a), (c-2)-(d)). 
Comparing policy CKC(LEGAL) to each school district, as seen in Table 3, 
show areas that have not been addressed in the multihazard EOP by district. Each X 
represents an included area, while a blank represents noninclusion. 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of CKC(LEGAL) 
District 
Four 
Stages Training Drills Coordination  
Train 
Derailment 
Board 
Presentation 
Visitor 
Policy 
A   X X       X 
B  X X    X 
C X X X X  X X 
D   X X X   X X 
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Through the comparison of school districts in Table 3, the two smaller school 
districts do not have all four stages of crisis planning included in their multihazard EOP. 
The area lacking is recovery; both touch on the idea, but not in a comprehensive way 
regarding reunification. In specific response to students, District A stated:  
We have two places in town that we can take all of our students should we need 
to evacuate. They are close enough that it would not take very much to get back 
into the learning process. Our plan is that we have evacuation points in different 
areas but that's an area that I'd really like to improve on. (personal 
communication, October 19, 2016)  
District B had a similar response: “Currently we don't have a place for reunification of 
students and parents” (personal communication, October 14, 2016). While the researcher 
did not give credit on Table 2 for this area, there is no requirement for how explicit the 
information should be in the area of recovery. Instead, the researcher used best practices 
for analysis based on the Department of Education’s Cycle of Crisis Planning 
(Department of Education, 2013). 
Also lacking is the coordination with first responders and the inclusion of first 
responders in the planning, meetings, and drills for Districts A and B. According to the 
superintendent of District A while answering question four, “We currently don't share 
our multihazard plan with first responders or county in any way” (personal 
communication, October 19, 2016). District B’s superintendent answered the same 
question with, “They currently don’t have a role in creating the plan. This is an area that 
we plan on reviewing and including in our district plan” (personal communication, 
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October 14, 2016). Through the conversation with the superintendents in the two larger 
districts, the researcher understood coordination with first responders to occur through 
their designated personnel, causing the researcher to conclude that as a district becomes 
larger and can afford extra personnel, they have more opportunities for coordination with 
outside agencies.  
 The areas in policy that address training, drills, and procedures for visitors to the 
campuses/district show all four districts in compliance. Drills are conducted in each 
district, staff is trained, and each district has a visitor protocol in place for each campus 
or district building. Districts A and D required the researcher to show a driver’s license 
prior to meeting with the superintendent of schools. In Districts B and C, the 
superintendent met the researcher at the door, not requiring the researcher to go through 
the visitor process.  
There is no documentation that the two smaller districts, A and B, present the 
security and safety audit to their school boards. Searching each district’s board book, 
which archives board meeting agendas, the researcher found that only two districts’ 
board agendas included a presentation of the audit results. Presentation to the school 
board for District C occurred in November 2014, and District D presented to their board 
of trustees in September 2014.  Both presentations were delivered by the designated 
personnel for each district. Since this is a three-year process, the next presentations 
would occur in the fall of 2017. Taking CKC(Legal), which is dictated by the state 
through the education code, and adding to the requirements allows districts to create a 
local policy without changing the legal policy.  
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While local policy is based on decisions by the local school board, these policies 
are vetted through the Texas Association of School Boards legal team, which explains 
why all three districts have the same CKC(LOCAL) policy in place (see Appendix C), 
which states, “The Superintendent shall ensure updating of the District’s Emergency 
Operations Plan and ongoing staff training” (Texas Association of School Boards, 2017). 
Through the interview process with each superintendent, it was revealed that each 
district does comply with this policy. This policy, while brief, allows the board of 
trustees for a school district to apply it to a superintendent’s evaluation under the area of 
district management, with the goal being that the superintendent demonstrates effective 
planning and management of the district administration, finances, operations, and 
personnel. Looking specifically at each district and whether the policy is followed, the 
researcher is confident that each superintendent is diligent in updating the plan and 
training the staff. 
Themes 
After the interviews were completed, the data were transcribed by the researcher. 
In order to label, sort, compile, and organize the qualitative data, the program QDA 
Miner was used to assist in creating codes for the data. Originally, four codes were 
preassigned: mitigation, preparedness, planning, and response. These codes were chosen 
specifically because they identify the four stages of crisis planning. Continuing the data 
analysis revealed other topics. One such theme labeled multijurisdiction was only 
present in two districts and would be considered a high priority in providing support to 
campuses in crisis. Multijurisdiction refers to a district that is serviced by first 
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responders through more than one government agency. Examples include a school 
district that logistically is within two separate counties or towns or a district that has 
facilities inside and outside of a city, requiring responses from city and county. Two 
other two themes, one of financial concerns and one of providing information for 
reunification, were represented across all four districts.  
During the interview process, participants discussed the initial planning of the 
EOP for their district. During that discussion, a concern for providing the newest and 
most up-to-date security measures is a reality in three of the districts due to lack of 
finances. Another acknowledged issue was dealing with multijurisdictional support from 
first responders. None of the participants discussed this as a concern; rather, it was 
mentioned in regard to response time. The superintendent’s response from District D 
included, “EMT [emergency medical technician] has been a bigger issue for us because 
we cover multiple counties so we have Travis County and Bastrop County and the EMT 
services out of Bastrop County” (personal communication, October 24, 2016). Finally, 
the lack of a reunification plan was a concern in three of the four districts. Each of these 
codes is discussed in relation to the research questions.  
Throughout the analysis, each of the four districts is referred to by a letter, with 
A being the smallest and D the largest in student population. Table 4 breaks down each 
district by the overall population of students, the percentage of low socioeconomic 
students in the district, and the amount of money set aside for security. This information 
was gathered through the Texas Education Agency’s Texas Academic Performance 
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Report (TAPR). Each district in Texas receives this report each year with information 
regarding students, staff, financials, and academics.   
 
Table 4  
 
District Information 
District Student Professional Auxiliary Percent Financial 
 Population Staff Staff Eco Dis Investment 
A 405 43 22 57.50%  $6,698 
B 962 97 50 41.50%  $25,600 
C 3,132 266 170 56.50%  $76,062 
D 4,299 368 224 75.70%  $282,097 
 
 
Within Table 4, professional staff refers to teachers and administrators while 
auxiliary staff refers to teacher aides, office personnel, maintenance staff, custodial staff, 
and transportation staff. Districts A and B have an adult-student ratio of 1:6, while 
Districts C and D have a ratio of 1:7. Each of these districts receives federal Title I 
money due to the percentage of economically disadvantaged students, a practice often 
referred to as students receiving free or reduced lunches. The district financial 
investment in safety and security, according to the 2016 TAPR, shows District D 
spending $65 per student, District C spending $24 per student, District B spending $26 
per student, and District A spending $16 per student. With District D so significantly 
different in comparison, the superintendent replied the following:  
Security cameras have been the most costly security measures. After Sandy Hook 
we put in the vestibule for safety in three of our buildings because our schools 
did not have anything to secure the elementary schools and the high schools. The 
middle school already had it. We've also included card readers at the entrances of 
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our buildings for all of our staff to come in and out which has been very costly. 
(personal communication, October 24, 2016)  
The four original codes of mitigation, preparedness, planning, and response, as well as 
the additional codes of multijurisdiction, financial constraints, and reunification will be 
discussed in relation to the research questions for this study.  
Analysis of Research Questions 
Question 1: What are the school district superintendent perceptions about their 
district's preparation for crisis? (Mitigation) 
Question one of the interview addressed mitigation, which refers to actions a 
district takes to reduce the loss of life and property. The superintendents were asked to 
discuss all those involved in the creation of the district multihazard EOP. Each district 
reported having a team that works together to create the plan. Comparing the four 
districts demonstrates that as a district gets larger, the size of the team also increases. 
While this is understandable as the larger districts have more schools, the glaring 
concern is that the two larger districts have personnel dedicated to the safety and security 
of the district while the two smaller districts must give the extra duties to a staff member 
who already has other responsibilities. District A reported a team of five, but the 
superintendent stated, “We are a very small district. In a very small district we wear a lot 
of different hats” (personal communication, October 19, 2016). In other words, with 
such a small team, each person takes on multiple positions in case someone were out of 
the district at the time of a crisis. District B reported a team of eight, with the technology 
director taking the lead. “Our technology director has this as his primary responsibility. 
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He facilitates the plan, the creation of the plan and helps to maintain it” (personal 
communication, October 14, 2016).  District C reported a team of 11, which includes the 
Emergency Management Coordinator. While the superintendent is involved in the 
overall process, many duties that fall to a superintendent in a smaller district are taken on 
by the coordinator. According to the superintendent of District C:  
So as superintendent I oversee the (EOP). The emergency coordinator’s role 
compiles and manages the EOP. Day-to-day operations fall to the emergency 
coordinator. That includes training and implementation of the plan at the 
different campuses and facilities. (personal communication, October 20, 2016) 
District D reported a team of 14, which includes the Director of Purchasing and 
Organizational Planning. Both Districts C and D discussed that they brought in local first 
responders to view the plan and offer suggestions while providing input for best 
practices according to their specific areas. According to the superintendent of District C, 
“We have a framework and then we bring them in and coordinate and facilitate together 
with those discussions over the plan. Each participant then provides input as to best 
practices or other recommendations” (personal communication, October 20, 2016). 
As larger districts ensure that the mitigation level is at its highest, smaller, rural 
districts struggle through the planning process. Without the same personnel as larger 
districts, the majority of the work falls to the superintendent or an employee hired for 
another position who takes on safety and security as well.  
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Question 2: What are the school district superintendent perceptions regarding their 
school district's efforts and measures to reduce or eliminate risk to life and 
property? (Preparedness) 
In order to gauge the preparedness of each school district, questions two and 
three were asked of the superintendents. One question was to find out who and if anyone 
else besides campus personnel is trained and the type of training received. The next 
question was multifaceted, looking specifically at active shooter/lockdown drills, the 
district monitoring of drills, and whether or not first responders are included in the drills.  
 Looking first at training, Districts A and B do not train any others besides school 
personnel. District A’s superintendent replied to this question: 
As far as site training we do with them—that is something we have not done that 
I think is something to look at in the future in our county as we begin to have a 
higher level of risk or safety than we’ve previously had. (personal 
communication, October 19, 2016) 
Outside of training personnel, Districts C and D train transportation, maintenance, and 
food service workers. District C is the only district that provides training for substitute 
teachers. The superintendent of District C explained as follows: 
Primarily we trained at the beginning of the year campus district staff but our 
coordinator meets with our substitutes multiple times during the year. That was 
something that we had found after our first incident, we created a module 
especially for substitutes. (personal communication, October 20, 2016)  
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The actual training for all school districts occurs during back-to-school activities, with 
the exception of the additional training for substitute teachers a few times during the 
year. Looking outside the district, the two larger districts also share the training with first 
responders. These answers again relate back to the lack of dedicated safety personnel. 
The two districts that train beyond the school are the two with safety coordinators. An 
area of concern that plagues both Districts A and B was verbalized by the superintendent 
of District A:  
If I'm off campus then somebody has to take over my role, if the principal’s off 
campus they have to plan for someone to take over their role. So we have to 
make sure we have people ready. We have to make sure we understand all 
positions because there's not a lot of us. (personal communication, October 19, 
2016) 
 As we looked at the active shooter drills, none of the districts at this time 
reported participating in a true active shooter drill. All the districts perform a lockdown 
or intruder drill at least once a year. There are differences in the drills held at each 
district. Districts A and B call for a lockdown drill, and the staff proceeds to lock the 
doors and account for all the students. District C, besides having a drill, also participates 
in a tabletop drill with the fire department and the police to go over scenarios of possible 
intruders or active shooters, as discussed in the interview: “We have done tabletop drills 
that we discussed with the fire department and the police and our staff and went over the 
scenario of what happens” (personal communication, October 20, 2016). District D takes 
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the normal drill and escalates it to include an “intruder” coming into the building in 
order to see how the staff responds: 
We do have intruder drills; in fact we have one coming up. We give our 
principals a heads up that in the next couple of weeks are going to be having an 
intruder drill; we don't give a date and time, but we want to see what the campus 
will do what somebody enters the facility. (personal communication, October 24, 
2016)  
All four districts monitor the completion of the drills either at the campus level or 
through the district security personnel. While all the districts monitor drills and train 
personnel, the level of specificity of the monitoring, as well as the training of personnel 
in support positions, continues to reveal the financial disparities among the four districts.   
Question 3: What are school district superintendent perceptions of their district's 
ability and capacity to respond to an emergency situation? (Response) 
Response refers to the immediate action taken; and in order to understand the 
districts’ response to a crisis, a question was asked of the superintendents about the 
inclusion of first responders. Looking at the inclusion of first responders in the drills, 
only District C has them participate in drills. The other three districts notify first 
responders of upcoming drills, but they do not have them on the campuses. According to 
District A: 
We don't really have first responders for the drills. We do make sure that they are 
available to our campuses so that the kids see and know who they are, but when 
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we actually come down to doing the drills we do not include them in the drills. 
(personal communication, October 19, 2016) 
Through this questioning, other concerns and solutions came to light, specifically 
from District C: 
One of the concerns was when the first responder rolls up, and they don't know 
who to talk to—there was no designated place. So we've gone through and said 
here’s where the students and staff are located, and we have a command post for 
the administrator in charge to meet the chief. Another thing we discovered is 
school district personnel walk around in regular clothes, while PD and FD [police 
and fire departments] are in their uniforms. In order to know who is in charge for 
the school we now all wear white vests. (personal communication, October 20, 
2016)  
The district used this strategy even without a crisis on campus: when the superintendent 
was called to a bus accident, he put on his white vest so the first responders knew he was 
the representative from the school district. 
While originally the question looked at how first responders are included in the 
EOP, the answers from the superintendents went down a different path. The answers 
actually coincided with question 10 about SROs and response time of first responders, as 
well as the groups that are the first responders, hospitals, and nurses, as reflected in 
Table 5.  
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Table 5 
 
First Responders 
District SRO Police Fire EMT 
Hospital 
Distance 
Nurses 
in 
District 
A No City Volunteer Volunteer 15 minutes RN 
B No City Volunteer Volunteer 30 minutes 
1 RN                  
1 LVN 
C 3 
Two 
Cities,             
County 
Professional 
and 
Volunteer Professional 60 minutes 
2 RN                     
3 LVN 
D 3 
City, Two 
Counties Professional  Professional 40 minutes 
2 RN                     
3 LVN 
 
 
As noted in Table 5, District A does not employ an SRO. Response time is 
between two and five minutes for first responders in this district. Previously, this district 
employed a chief of police for the district, but as money from the state decreased, the 
district had to make a decision to rely on the city police instead of funding the position. 
“The hard decision was having the chief of police leave and to decide: do we continue 
that or can we just rely on the city police department? As a small rural school district, 
funding is extremely difficult” (personal communication, October 19, 2016). The 
concern of both smaller districts is having to choose between positions instead of being 
able to fund all positions that are needed. 
District B does not have an SRO. Prior to the state budget cuts, a staff member 
was a licensed peace officer and provided SRO support to the district along with his 
normal duties. Response time for this district is also five minutes. While two to five 
minutes appears to be a quick response, as stated earlier in Chapter Two, the response 
time from the police was less than six minutes from the first phone call placed to the 
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time the first police officers entered the building at Sandy Hook, and it was not fast 
enough to save the lives of 27 people (Connecticut Police Chief Association, 2013).  
District C and District D have faster response times with the inclusion of an SRO 
on campus, but the concern for these campuses is the multijurisdictional response for 
getting more help. Superintendent D stated, “The longer response would be the EMT; 
depends on which school due to multiple jurisdictions” (personal communication, 
October 24, 2016). With different schools in different counties or cities, the school must 
work with multiple first responders. The team to respond is not always the team that 
would be the fastest to arrive, which can compromise the schools in a crisis situation. 
This situation was conveyed by District C’s superintendent: “We have an interesting 
situation where we have a volunteer department with the county, yet we have a fire 
department that is professional and sometimes our volunteer department can get there 
faster” (personal communication, October 20, 2016). The problem this situation creates 
is one of two departments vying for the control of the emergency situation, putting the 
school district in the middle. 
While superintendents in Districts A and B mentioned not including the first 
responders, through the interview process, overwhelmingly the small town atmosphere 
of both of these districts was seen as a positive for the superintendents in response time. 
The local police and fire department are more readily available to offer support should it 
be needed. 
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Question 4: What are the school district superintendent perceptions about 
restoring the learning environment and evaluating the phases of the crisis plan? 
(Recovery) 
Recovery after an incident refers to restoring the learning environment or 
reunification between parents and students, as well as evaluating how a crisis was 
handled. Though the interviews with the superintendents, two questions were asked to 
address recovery. These questions looked specifically at the after-action review and the 
plan for students after a crisis. All four districts participate in an after-action evaluation. 
In District A, the superintendent commented about making sure to adjust and make 
changes as needed:  
We talk about things like did we come out in time, did everybody get to the 
places they need, do we need to reorder staging areas. That's the value of having 
a drill so that you can make the changes you need to. (personal communication, 
October 19, 2016) 
District D has an interesting addition of a scribe to gather more information: 
Debriefs are conducted immediately following incidents or drills. After-action 
reports are reviewed and discussed as well. During actual incidents, scribes are 
designated and their notes are included in the debriefings and after-action reports. 
(personal communication, October 24, 2016) 
Districts went over areas that did not follow the plan, asked for input on ways to 
improve, and shared information with campus staff. According to District B’s 
superintendent:  
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Every second and fourth Monday we have a leadership meeting. If we've had a 
drill we go over the drills with this group discussing items like substitutes, 
concerns, any changes that need to be made. Campus principals or the directors 
then take this information back to their staff. One concern we've had is the shared 
faculty between campuses; it becomes a logistics issue. (personal 
communication, October 14, 2016) 
(Shared faculty relates to teachers who travel between the schools.)  
    Districts C and D take the evaluation one step further with immediately 
providing an update to the multihazard EOP with any changes that needed to be made. 
According to District C, “it’s a living document; we make changes or update different 
pieces or tweak with the after-action meetings” (personal communication, October 20, 
2016). Again, having the ability to continually update the plan is made possible through 
having a dedicated person that handles all the safety and security for the district. 
Districts A and B note that changes become available in the next year’s plan. 
Reunification to the learning environment after students leaving is an area that is 
very different in all four districts. The superintendent for District A discussed having an 
evacuation site for students. District B does not at this time have an evacuation site lined 
up. District D has protocols and kits for each campus to assist in the reunification 
process. District C has a very detailed reunification process. Besides having a place for 
evacuation, the district has created protocols for parents to pick up their children after a 
crisis. The superintendent specifically discussed the possibility of an active shooter in 
regard to reunification: 
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How to address getting parents to stop and wait—we spent a lot of time walking 
through that discussion even down to the point where the parent gets a ticket and 
if their child has been shot, you don't get to go with the ticket to the holding place 
with kids. You are funneled to another area with counselors. How to get those 
parents separated out is a part of the plan; we plan to have PD there at the very 
beginning to help us to get pet parents to stop and to wait. (personal 
communication, October 20, 2016)  
Emergency Operations Plan 
Through an analysis of each district’s multihazard plan, the researcher was able 
to triangulate the data from the interviews, policy, and the plan. In regard to the answers 
given by the superintendents, the multihazard plan provided more detail in 
understanding the answers to the interview questions while also addressing the 
overarching research question of whether districts are prepared for intruders or active 
shooters. Realizing that mandates from the state only address the basics that must be 
covered, Table 6 is a list of selected practices from the Department of Education and the 
Department of Homeland Security that all schools should consider when planning for a 
crisis situation.  
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Table 6 
Best Practices for School Districts 
Selected Practices 
Allocate time to emergency management planning 
Conduct an assessment of vulnerabilities 
Conduct regular drills 
Identify and acquire equipment to mitigate and respond to emergencies 
Develop an emergency management plan and update the plan on a regular basis 
Note. Adapted from Department of Education, (2013). 
 
 
The researcher applied Table 6 to the conversations with the superintendents and 
the analysis of the EOP. The time to plan is part of each district’s protocol, yet most 
districts update each summer in order to address training needs with staff at the 
beginning of school. Instead, the EOP should be a fluid document, having the planning 
on a continuum so that as each drill is completed, districts update or upgrade to address 
the evaluation of the drills conducted.  
Overall the plans are similar in the basic items included. Each plan includes 
overall concepts, objectives, and general statements without giving information on how 
the plan is carried out. For instance, while all four districts have an area stating that a 
reunification plan is in place, only one district has a full plan published. It appears 
through inspection that all the districts have used a template to create a basic plan. 
Districts need to include specifics for their district so that in the event of a crisis, first 
responders know what to expect.   
While many of the sections regarding mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery were discussed in previous sections, it is critical to look at the specifics of the 
EOP in regard to intruders or active shooters. Each district has an EOP comprising 10 
 71 
 
sections: Authority, Purpose, Explanation of Terms, Situation and Assumptions, Concept 
of Operations, Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities, Direction and Control, 
Readiness Levels, Administration and Support, and Plan Development and Maintenance. 
Upon review of these sections, they are appropriately titled “Basic Plan” since little 
district detail is provided. The differences in the plans occur within their appendices. For 
the purpose of this section of analysis, only items related to intruder or active shooter 
were analyzed. Additionally, the specific details of the EOP are not shared within this 
research due to the need for confidentiality. Instead, generalities are discussed so as to 
prevent compromising the safety of any district.  
District A has four specific pages titled Evacuation, Lockdown, Severe Weather, 
and Reverse Evacuation within the appendix. The specific “To Do” page in the event of 
an intruder or active shooter provides the staff with 13 steps to follow. These steps 
include items such as what to do when the announcement begins, where to assemble the 
class, and the process for holding the students. The one-page document is written so that 
each teacher can have it posted in their classroom. Districts B and D do not include a 
separate page for a lockdown on campus. The information within each plan only gives a 
vague response to a lockdown, which in essence requires staff to lock down the entire 
campus with students inside. No mention is given of what to do with students who are 
out of the classroom, what to do if the entire class is in another area, or how staff will 
know when the crisis is over. District C has by far the most extensive plan, with an entire 
section of the appendix set aside for information related to an intruder or active shooter. 
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This section provides detailed information from the beginning of a crisis to the final 
steps of reunification after a crisis of an intruder or active shooter is over.   
Financial Records 
All school districts in the State of Texas are required to post on their district 
Website their adopted budget. Within this budget, all districts report under Function 52, 
security and monitoring. Because districts may have special projects that would increase 
this budgeted amount for one year, this study analyzed the budgets of each district for 
the last three years in order to look for a pattern. It was also taken into account that 
security can be paid out of cocurricular/extracurricular activities according to Function 
35 or out of debt service according to Function 71. In order to analyze whether any of 
the budget amounts in Function 35 or 71 were used to supplement Function 52, follow-
up questions were asked of the superintendents. 
District A is a 2A district with a total budget of $4,012,865. Of this total, $44,318 
was budgeted in 2014 for Function 52, security and monitoring. In 2015, this district had 
an increase in its overall budget to $4,416,638, yet the security and monitoring line item 
decreased to $9,198. For the current year 2016, the district again had an overall increase 
in its budget to $4,532,798 and once again lowered Function 52 to $6,698. Looking at 
the last three years, this district increased the overall budget by $519,933 while 
decreasing security and monitoring by $37,620. When asked about the most costly 
security measures put in place, according to the superintendent: 
Our security system is about $30,000 which includes cameras, and for a small 
school we have a pretty good infrastructure with technology). The Raptor system, 
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which was about $35,000 to $40,000, we have a crossing guard that we pay for 
that salary, and used to have a chief of police which is about $35,000 to $40,000. 
(personal communication, October 19, 2016) 
District B is a 3A district with a total operating budget of $9,067,324 in 2014. 
Function 52, security and monitoring, was budgeted at $26,300. For the next year, 2015, 
District B increased the overall budget to $9,676,589 and also increased the security and 
monitoring to $33,100. The current 2016 budget increased to $9,799,068, and the 
Function 52 line item decreased to $25,600. In comparing the last three years, District B 
increased the overall budget by $731,744, and the security budget line item went up 
$6,800 from 2014 to 2015, but decreased by $7,500 from 2015 to 2016, which averages 
out to a decrease of $700. This district’s superintendent responded to the question about 
costly security measures for his district: 
Upgrading our cameras has been our most costly security measure. We've added 
more cameras although we still need to have more. One of the areas that we are 
working on, but it's going to be very expensive is trying to find a way to secure 
our secondary campus from the outside. We’re looking at some fencing to go 
around the front, but the concern is that the back will still be open because of the 
students who go back and forth to the gym or to the AG [agriculture] building. 
(personal communication, October 14, 2016)   
District B passed a bond allowing for a safety vestibule to be included in the remodel of 
the high school. Also discussed was the potential for a technology surplus in the budget. 
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“Any surplus technology funds we use to buy extra cameras” (personal communication, 
October 14, 2016). 
District C is a 4A district with a 2014 total operating budget of $30,590,076. 
Function 52, security and monitoring, was budgeted at $67,874. During the 2015 budget 
cycle, the overall budget increased to $32,301,020, as did the security and monitoring 
line item to $76,062. The current budget for 2016 increased to $32,363,680, and again 
the security and monitoring item increased to $81,804. Over the past three years, the 
overall budget increased by $1,773,604, and the Function 52 line item also showed an 
increase of $13,930. Costly security measures for this district are as follows according to 
the superintendent: 
Most costly security is the SRO: we have one primarily at the high school and 
goes to the middle school time during the day; at least once a week he goes to 
visit the elementary but day-to-day at the high school. The radio system is also a 
little bit ongoing but it was just an initial $15,000 for an initial investment which 
ties in with the first responders through the tricounty system. (personal 
communication, October 20, 2016) 
This district also recently passed a bond through the bond buying program and was able 
to create a secure entrance at every school, to provide more cabling for security cameras, 
and to provide fencing at all schools.  
District D is a 5A district with a 2014 total operating budget of $35,108,925. For 
the 2015 budget, the overall budget increased to $37,726,726, and Function 52 security 
and monitoring also increased to $273,648. The current budget year of 2016 has the 
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overall budget at $39,095,687, while Function 52 totaled $282,097. However, while the 
amount of dollars increased, the percentage spent in the line item remained the same at 
0.7%. Overall for the past three years the budget has increased by $3,986,762, and the 
security and monitoring line item has increased by $10,078. When asked about costly 
security measures put in place, the superintendent responded: 
Security cameras have been the most costly security measures. After Sandy Hook 
we put in the vestibule for safety in three of our buildings because our schools 
did not have anything to secure the elementary schools and the high schools. 
We've also included card readers at the entrances of our buildings for all of our 
staff to come in and out, which has been very costly. We are moving away from 
keys. (personal communication, October 24, 2016)  
Even in the largest district, trying to find ways to upgrade old campuses with the newest 
security measures continues to be a struggle as seen in the following response: 
“Financially, we would like to change our card readers to electrical instead of battery-
operated and upgrade our alarm system, but that would be very costly so for now we just 
are using what we have” (personal communication, October 24, 2016). 
After meeting with each superintendent and discussing Function 52, it’s clear 
that there is not a common use across the four districts for the use of this money. The 
two larger districts fund a staff member to handle and oversee safety and security in the 
district. District D pays the salary of its Director of Purchasing and Organizational 
Planning, and District C pays for an SRO for its outlying school, as well as the salary of 
the Emergency Management Coordinator.  
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Districts B and C are also using bond money to upgrade fencing and vestibules 
on campuses. All four districts use other line items to fund police at athletic events, on 
the campuses, and within the district, as well as more cameras and radios. Examples 
include line item 36, cocurricular/extracurricular activities, which is used to pay for 
security at athletic events; line item 12, instructional resources, technology budget, is 
often used to fund the purchase and installation of security cameras. Through the 
interview process, each superintendent discussed using money from multiple areas to 
fund major security items. Finally, during the interview process with all four districts, 
comments were made about needing to upgrade security after the crisis at Sandy Hook. 
A common theme from all districts arose, as stated by the superintendent of District A: 
“It has always been about finding the budget to be able to get things done that we need” 
(personal communication, October 19, 2016). 
A final comparison of the four districts in funding applies to the square mileage 
of the district boundaries for small schools. The State of Texas funds school districts 
differently according to the square mileage making up the school district boundary. 
Schools under 301 square miles receive less funding per student than those above 301 
square miles. Of the four districts in this study, Districts A and B do not meet the 301 
square miles and are considered small districts. Should this penalty be removed from 
state funding, District A would receive an additional $524,336, and District B would 
receive an additional $746,395 a year (Equity Center, 2017). As both district 
superintendents discussed the lack of funding to be able to upgrade security or provide 
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an SRO, these additional funds would allow them to get closer to the staffing or security 
measures of the larger two districts.  
Conclusion 
As the interview data were analyzed and compared to the financial, policy, and 
EOP data, major differences in the four districts were highlighted. The ability to finance 
capital improvements or extra personnel in the area of safety is clearly the largest 
difference in the school districts. While the section on finance is only considered one 
area within the research, the money or lack of money encompasses all the areas 
researched. The ability to hire a dedicated person to coordinate the EOP or an SRO to 
improve the response time to a campus would allow smaller districts to improve upon 
the overall safety of the district. Other areas of concern relate to having first responders 
in multiple areas. The multijurisdictional issues are a concern in response time for the 
two districts spread across multiple municipalities, as well as the overall lack of 
including first responders, not only in the creation of the EOP but also in participating in 
the drills. The more familiar first responders are of the crisis response, the easier and 
quicker they will be able to help should a crisis occur.  
Throughout this chapter, the researcher provided an analysis of interview data, 
financial records, policy, and EOPs as they apply to the overarching research question of 
how prepared the schools are in addressing intruders and active shooters. Realizing that 
no school district can be completely prepared and that there is no fool-proof plan that 
can be created, there are safety measures, planning, and considerations that must be 
implemented or improved in order to provide a more secure educational environment. 
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With the realization that school districts, not just in Texas but across the country, must 
continue to upgrade security and safety in order to keep staff and students safe, EOPs 
should be at the forefront for all superintendents. Media continue to report on school 
shootings, as well as other mass shootings in public venues. As said best by the 
superintendent of District A, “So priorities have to change as the time changes. Today's 
message is a different era even from five years ago; we have to plan accordingly as the 
country's changing” (personal communication, October 19, 2016). 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
 
This evaluative case study intended to analyze the preparedness of school 
districts in relation to active shooters using the four stages of crisis planning: mitigation, 
preparedness, planning, and response. By applying analysis of the interview data, 
financial statements, policy, and EOP to the PET framework, the researcher was able to 
provide background information on how and why school districts are not in a continual 
state of change or improvement in regard to safety and security. Other areas to discuss 
include the overall process of crisis planning and financial constraints in relation to safe 
and secure schools.  
Discussion 
School districts are required to follow TEC policy with little to no variance. 
Looking specifically at the realm of school safety, school districts are doing the best they 
can with what they have, and no school district is deliberately failing to provide safety 
and security for their staff and students. Yet the following topics regarding preparedness 
unfolded as the research progressed: evolution of how school districts change, school 
district adaptation to changes in society, changes in crisis planning, and how funding and 
location can affect crisis planning or security. These topics, along with reflections from 
the researcher, are discussed in the following sections.  
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Evolution of Change 
PET has three components: deep structures, equilibrium periods, and 
revolutionary change according to Gersick (1991). Deep structures, applied to school 
districts, refers to the rules and policies school districts must follow. These structures are 
in place to provide stability, and there is little variance from the state leadership creating 
policy. Each school district within this research project has deep structures in place. As 
this study has shown, the four school districts in this study have implemented policy set 
forth by the State of Texas. Equilibrium periods refers to day-to-day operations; not 
every day is the same, and small changes will occur constantly that do not change the 
overall deep structure. In other words, while policy stays the same, processes or 
procedures to address the policy change. District C gave an example of this period of 
equilibrium when the superintendent stated, “We changed our protocol for bomb threats. 
If the police get the call, we automatically evacuate as the PD is required to search the 
campus, but if we get the call first then we evaluate with input from the campus” 
(personal communication, October 20, 2016). This small procedural change does not 
affect the deep structure of the EOP; it only addresses a way to improve. Revolutionary 
change refers to a game changer; something has happened to upend the way school 
districts operate. Examples of a revolutionary period would be the massacre at 
Columbine High School, which changed the process for first responders to enter the 
building. Using these concepts and applying this information to the districts studied, 
Figure 2 shows how PET applies to safety and security in school districts. 
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Figure 2. Punctuated equilibrium theory in crisis situations. Reprinted from Wolf (2015).  
 
 
The PET model in Figure 2 shows how schools evolve over time. Districts go 
through long periods of stability, as shown with the arrows titled “stable environment.” 
These periods of stability are punctuated by relatively short bursts of fundamental 
change, titled “rapidly changing environment” on the graph. The line graph continues to 
rise as school districts evolve through the years, or to put it another way, school districts 
learn from their mistakes and continue to get better. Applying the analysis of the four 
districts to this figure would show the first increase as the Columbine shootings causing 
school districts to evolve in the area of crisis planning, followed by a period of stability. 
The next jump is a smaller, more gradual increase that could have resulted from 
legislative updates or changes for school districts, again followed by a period of stability. 
The final increase is again a large increase, which would represent the Sandy Hook 
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Elementary School massacre, which leads the researcher to believe that we are again in a 
period of stability.  
Taking it one step further, Figure 2 also applies to the increased security of the 
four school districts. As the rapidly changing stages occurred, such as Sandy Hook, the 
four school districts increased their financial obligations toward a more secure 
environment. According to the superintendents, each district upgrades to secure 
vestibules in older schools. Three of the districts were forced to raise taxes through the 
bond process in order to finance the construction, while the fourth district transferred 
funds within the current accounts and used fund balance to pay for the costs.  
In an effort to understand why school districts do not continually upgrade and 
improve upon security, we must look back at the research in Chapter Two. Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) believed that changes are either an overreaction or underreaction to 
information, while Birkland and Lawrence (2009) believed that one event could show a 
failure within a school system or an accumulation of problems over a period of time. To 
apply Gersick’s (1991) explanation of PET, organizations make changes or improve 
through times of upheaval. Overall, school districts remain in a stable period for long 
periods of time. Yet when a major incident occurs, the school system has a dramatic 
change prior to another stable period. These changes can result in upgraded security, a 
need to increase funds or local policy/procedural changes. The pattern of the PET 
demands that school districts understand that the current period of stability will end, 
again bringing us back to the question of school districts being prepared for active 
shooters.  
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Adaptation to Societal Changes 
As mass shootings are occurring more often around the country, school districts 
must remember that preparing for a crisis in general and preparing for an active shooter 
are not the same (United States Department of Education, 2013). When a 911 call 
regarding an active shooter on a campus is made, first responders have one objective— 
protect students and staff. Active shooter situations are defined as “those where an 
individual is actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and 
populated area” (United States Department of Education, 2013, pg. 56). 
Even as the Department of Education states that active shooter situations should 
be treated differently, three of the four school districts in this study do not have a 
separate plan for an active shooter crisis, and none of the four school districts 
interviewed have specific active shooter drills. It was implied that the shelter-in-place or 
lockdown drills are considered to address the issue of an active shooter. The most 
troubling comment was that school districts are behind in updating the training needs in 
the event of an active shooter.  
Digging deeper into the four districts studied, concern remains in that school 
districts do not have the ability and capacity to respond to an active shooter. Looking 
specifically at the response time to campus, all four districts stated the response time of 
first responders to be five minutes on average. Keep in mind that according to the 
Connecticut Police Chief Association (2013), the response time from the police was less 
than six minutes before the first police officers entered Sandy Hook Elementary School. 
The only areas where the districts participating in this study would have a shorter 
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response time would be the secondary campuses in Districts C and D, as both have an 
SRO on campus. Realizing the lack of response for Districts A and B, the lack of 
financial support comes to the forefront again.  
School administrators believe that increased security measures are effective in 
increasing student safety, the most common security measure being security personnel 
(Garcia, 2003). Should they have the funding received by other school districts, each 
district would have an SRO, as previously reported by the two districts without the 
security. The most relevant advantage of an SRO on campus is the increase in response 
time, making the SRO the true first responder to an incident (Barnes, 2016). SROs have 
reported that being stationed on campus creates a safer environment, and the police 
uniform and authority of the officer are viewed as deterrents (Barnes, 2016). There is 
also evidence to suggest the importance of integrating an SRO into school district safety 
planning (Benigni, 2004). The perspective of an SRO in creating and managing an EOP 
is the perspective of the first responder. Both districts in this study without an SRO had 
one previously, but due to budget cuts at the state level had to let them go, which sums 
up the concern that rural districts, without the proper funding from the state, sacrifice 
security of students and staff.  
Another theme that applied to two districts is the concern with multijurisdictional 
help in a crisis. Even though this theme did not encompass all those interviewed, the 
importance lies in the commonalities across the state, as this applies to school districts 
that are spread out into multiple cities or multiple counties. Looking back at the question 
of adapting to changes in society, increasing the wait time of first responders is not only 
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unacceptable, but not prudent. The two larger districts interviewed place the first-
responder-coordination requirement on the superintendent in order to receive help the 
fastest. There are many districts that find themselves in the same situation, and while it’s 
fortunate that there has not been a loss of life due to wait time, this particular theme 
remains a priority and will be further discussed in the section on implications.  
Crisis Planning 
The PET concept of the equilibrium period is where most of the school districts 
have displayed change in safety and security. Preparing for a crisis situation through an 
EOP is commonplace for school administrators. While having an EOP falls under the 
concept of deep structure and is a mandate by the state, the implementation of the plan 
remains in the equilibrium period, where changes should occur regularly in order for 
continuous improvement. Research conducted on the four school districts shows a 
variation in continuous improvement. Through this equilibrium period where changes 
occur, districts must rely on the evaluative phase of planning. Evaluating EOPs, drills 
conducted, and personnel within the security committees allows school districts to keep 
up with changes and address areas of need. Realizing that “plan, prepare, and practice” 
must be a regular occurrence for safety drills, there is currently no monitoring that these 
drills are occurring, and there is no oversight (Trump & Lavarello, 2000-2006; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2007). Even with no oversight, the school districts complete 
drills monthly in each district: fire, tornado, intruder, and shelter-in-place. McDonnell 
and Elmore (1987) addressed the idea that without mandates, superintendents will lack 
follow-through. While realizing that some mandates need to be in place to require 
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superintendents to address policy changes, the superintendents interviewed did not need 
mandates to follow through because they prioritize the ultimate goal, the safety and 
security of staff and students.  
As shown in the previous chapter, the superintendents’ comments and answers to 
questions regarding crisis planning were varied. All four districts have followed the 
requirements set forth by the state in response to EOP creation; however, only one 
district, District C, has taken the requirements and expanded in all areas. While two of 
the superintendents understand all the concepts of crisis planning and were able to 
clearly communicate concerns, the other two answered the questions with not near as 
much depth. Along those same lines, according to McLaughlin (1991), those who 
interpret and implement the policy through the EOP are the ones who make a success or 
failure from crisis preparation. In order to create an EOP, interpretation and 
implementation are essential to achieve success.  
Planning and managing change in schools requires superintendents to create 
committees that encompass members across the district in order to gain other 
perspectives. With this understanding, the superintendent is not the sole person creating 
an EOP; districts create committees, and some districts are able to hire a dedicated 
coordinator who can attend trainings across the state on best practices. Observations 
showed the two larger districts answering at a higher level, the difference being that 
these districts are supported with a dedicated person responsible for the overall planning 
of emergency operations. Besides the dedicated personnel including the coordinator and 
an SRO, the larger districts are able to include more personnel on their security 
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committees. Realizing that more doesn’t always mean better, being able to divide out the 
jobs as opposed to each person having multiple responsibilities in a crisis allows for 
stronger coordination of a crisis situation. For example, in a smaller district, the 
superintendent wears multiple hats and is often responsible for being the incident 
commander and the communication officer. These two positions in a crisis are essential, 
and one person holding both positions causes one to be lacking. 
While all four districts have these security committees, the inclusion of first 
responders from the beginning of the process through the actual completed drill is 
missing. Elkland (2017) stated that having first responders on safety teams allows for 
effective response to a crisis. First responders need to be included and take a more active 
role in emergency plans for school districts. On the school district side, first responders 
should be included in the beginning planning process to ensure that best practices are 
being used. Planning is occurring at the district level, but first responders are included 
more as an afterthought instead of at the beginning of the planning process. The 
knowledge and skills they can bring to a planning session are essential for schools to 
understand police and fire procedures, as well as for first responders understanding 
school district procedures. Once districts have drills scheduled, those schedules need to 
be shared with first responders in order for them to practice response as well. The norm 
should not be a first responder arriving on campus for the first time during a crisis, as the 
time spent to acclimate with the building wastes valuable time.  
School districts have the obligation to plan and manage the change needed in 
order to provide a safe and secure learning environment. Districts are creating the 
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mandated EOP as directed by the Texas Education Agency and the TEC, even as the 
actual creation varies in information across districts. More work is still needed to address 
the inclusion of first responders in the mitigation and preparedness phases, as well as the 
restoration of the learning environment and the reunification portions of recovery. The 
researcher’s perception of the interviews conducted tends to relate back to the lack of 
urgency in believing that an active shooter crisis could occur in any school and in any 
district of any size. 
Funding and Location   
As for the financial aspect of providing needed security, for small districts to 
have the same safety measures as larger districts, funding would be required from the 
state. Larger districts have extra personnel who can dedicate their day to improving 
security in the district, while in the smaller districts, that job falls to the superintendent, 
who is already overburdened with multiple jobs due to lack of administration personnel. 
Even though the larger districts have those extra positions, requirements or 
improvements still need to occur to address the specifics of active shooters. 
Addressing the lack of funding, Figure 3 is a representation of the information 
gathered during the interview process. With increased funding by the state, the school 
districts in this study would address hiring of personnel. A dedicated coordinator for 
safety and security would alleviate some of the extra duties that not only the 
superintendents in small district take on, but also the extra duties picked up by the other 
members of the district. Although not discussed during the interviews, having a 
dedicated person who could attend the training that occurs at the Texas State University 
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Safety Center would allow the districts to stay up to date on best practices. Another hire 
essential to school safety is the SRO. This position not only provides day-to-day support, 
but decreases the response time by becoming the first responder in the event of a crisis.  
The other two areas needing more financial support, depicted in Figure 3, are 
related to purchasing. These costs would not be ongoing each year, except in terms of 
replacement cycles for the purchasing of security items. The first expenditure is 
maintenance, bringing old buildings up to date with the newest security or even 
addressing areas that are currently not secure. The other area all four districts discussed 
is the purchase of more security cameras, updated alarm systems, or key codes to enter 
buildings.  
 
 
Figure 3. Financial implications. 
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Sedensky (2013) stated that Sandy Hook had the latest security measures in 
place: secure vestibule, camera system to view the front door, and a call box at the front 
door. Districts A, B, and D do not have secure vestibules in all schools. In fact, only 
District C has been able to provide a secure entrance for each school due to the passing 
of a bond. The amount of money to bring older buildings up to date with the newest 
security is not something the state would be able to finance; thus, the burden falls back 
to the districts. Through conversations, a concern remains that while each superintendent 
knows a crisis could happen, school districts tend to become complacent. It was noticed 
that the smaller districts do not worry as much as the larger districts. Whether it’s a small 
district mentality of “we know everyone in town” or the idea of “things like that don’t 
happen here,” rural districts do not have the same sense of urgency (personal 
communication, October 14, 2016). 
Unfortunately, being a smaller or rural district does not mean an active shooter 
situation won’t occur. Hawkins et al. (1998) referred to safe communities and the 
perception that schools in these areas have a false sense of security. Instead, what has 
been shown is that the two deadliest school shootings did not occur in inner-city schools. 
As the study by Hankin et al. (2011) reported, school violence does not decrease 
according to the security measures in place for any school, rural or inner-city. Instead, 
the only measures in place that show signs of decreasing student deaths in active shooter 
incidents are training and having procedures in place—showing that a sense of urgency 
needs to exist in school districts. While the study by Hankin et al. (2011) elevates 
training and procedures as the keys to active shooter incidents, the district 
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superintendents stated that there needs to be a balance, and should there be security 
measures that have proved to provide results, all districts of all sizes should have the 
ability to provide that security. Until the state is able to fund in an equitable fashion, 
rural districts are left to wonder why their students do not warrant the same security as 
students in large districts. 
Reflections from the Researcher 
As the case study was completed, the researcher had to refer back to any bias 
held. Holding the position of superintendent in another district gave the researcher an 
insight to the answers given through the interview process, a better understanding of the 
financials and the job, and knowledge of how to dig deeper into the questioning.  
The job of superintendent is all-encompassing in a school district. Realizing that 
the superintendent is responsible for every person and every occurrence within the 
school district places a heavy burden on the position and person. Throughout the 
interviews, the sincerity of each superintendent was genuine. All four are aware of the 
implications of failing to have the most up-to-date security, an SRO, and a strong crisis 
planning process.  
Even though there is research that implies a lack of district leadership, the 
researcher believes that this is a misunderstanding of the vastness of the job. Looking 
first at the EOP, Elkland (2017) completed research with the administrators rating EOPs 
as less effective than other school personnel rating the same plans. The understanding of 
the superintendent of how the complexity of the plan pertains to an entire district is one 
explanation. The “less-effective” rating could also be ascribed to continuous 
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improvement, as superintendents rarely are satisfied with the status quo and constantly 
search for ways to improve schools. Another explanation could be the ambiguity in the 
development of the plan (Cornell & Sheras, 1998). As a result of complexity and 
ambiguity, EOPs may appear to lack the quality and quantity of effective crisis 
intervention strategies that are multidimensional. Once again looking at the specific 
position of superintendent, the majority of the decisions made are multidimensional. 
Decisions made regarding one person can have ripple effects through the entire district. 
Seldom is this multidimensional decision-making realized by others in the district. For 
this reason alone, district leaders may not be able to convey the multidimensional piece 
of the EOP to all staff.  
Another area of concern is in the effective execution of the EOP, including the 
evaluation conducted after a drill or crisis (Elkland, 2017). With the education 
background of the superintendents, this is an area of strength for all four. Bringing the 
teams back together to discuss the plan and areas of concerns falls into the field of 
continuous improvement where high level school personnel tend to excel. The effective 
execution of a plan and the debriefing by the security team in order to improve are 
crucial (Brock et al., 2009). However, Elkland (2017) also wondered if superintendents 
perceive each drill or crisis as unique and if they have difficulty making event-specific 
changes to comprehensive crisis plans. This could explain how the two districts without 
dedicated security personnel tend to make changes to the plan at a higher level instead of 
more detailed changes. Even looking at the two roles of superintendent and principal, a 
principal making change affects one campus, one set of faculty and students, while a 
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superintendent making changes, depending on the size of the district, affects multiple 
schools, multiple sets of faculty and students.  
Through body language and tone of voice, it appeared that at times some of the 
answers given were what the superintendent thought the researcher might “want to hear” 
as opposed to what the district was actually doing. There were also times during the 
interview process where the superintendents were unable to answer the questions and 
had to be prompted with ideas. This occurred more often in the larger districts where 
there is a dedicated safety person, causing the researcher to question whether the extra 
personnel provides a barrier to the superintendent thus removing them from day to day 
safety concerns. In other words do larger districts become more bureaucratic and does 
that affect the superintendent’s lack of urgency as they are further removed from the 
planning? 
A final thought using my bias in regard to superintendents is political. Although 
this area was not discussed in the interviews, it is an area of concern. The role of the 
superintendent is changing, whether through legislative actions, the Commissioner of 
Education, or the Texas Education Agency. This position is no longer an education 
manager, but instead a chief executive officer (CEO) of a multimillion dollar business. 
In other words, as problems occur, much like in a corporation the CEO is held 
responsible in the public eye. Yet, besides a university president no other positions are 
responsible for such a large number of students on a daily basis. So effectiveness may 
instead be related to the burden of responsibility of the job.  
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In summation, addressing the overarching question of how schools are prepared 
to address intruders or active shooters, this study shows that the larger the district, the 
more prepared the district is in terms of safety measures put in place. How the school 
system allocates attention to the crisis is as critical as how those who create the policies 
respond to the crisis; however, the financial inequities across the four districts have an 
impact on all areas of safety and security. 
Implications 
 The research conducted in this study provides an awareness of some of the 
problems faced by school districts. While the research was only conducted with four 
districts, the variety of district size allows for a look at different situations that could 
occur across the state. The findings in this study should provide an understanding for the 
State Legislature, the Texas Education Agency, and school district personnel. A true 
understanding of these challenges will provide a basis for improvement that will allow 
all schools, as well as the state, to provide the same types of security and safety for 
students so that schools are safer overall. This section on implications based on research 
takes the concerns addressed earlier and expands to highlight problems that may occur 
across the state.  
 Often, implications of research address the need for a model or process to be put 
in place. With the help from the United States Department of Education (2007), as seen 
in Figure 1, the Cycle of Crisis Planning already provides a framework that all school 
districts should be following. The implication for school districts, therefore, is evaluation 
of the district EOP to ensure that all four areas of crisis planning are covered. Realizing 
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that districts are never “finished” with the EOP and that it must be continually reviewed 
and revised, this framework is a tool to remind districts of the importance of reviewing 
and improving existing plans.  
With the framework already in place, the phase of recovery continues to be the 
area where the most work is needed according to interview data with the representative 
superintendents. In a later article, the United States Department of Education (2013) 
provided more information on the recovery phase (see Table 7), but this information 
needs to be updated at the school district level. Updated changes include the emotional 
recovery of staff and students in multiple steps previously not included in the original 
recovery phase. 
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Table 7 
 
Recovery Phase 
Steps for Recovery               
During recovery, return to learning and restore the infrastructure as quickly as 
possible. 
Strive to return to learning as quickly as possible. 
Restore the physical plant, as well as the school 
community. 
   
Monitor how staff are assessing students for the emotional impact of the 
crisis. 
 
Identify what follow-up interventions are available to students, staff, and first 
responders. 
Conduct debriefings with staff and first 
responders. 
    
Assess curricular activities that address the 
crisis. 
    
Allocate appropriate time for 
recovery. 
     
Plan how anniversaries of events will be 
commemorated. 
   
Capture "lessons learned" and incorporate them into revisions and 
trainings. 
  
Note. Adapted from Department of Education (2013). 
 
 
Realizing that the four phases of crisis planning need to be included in the overall 
process of planning, the evaluative results in this study could provide support for other 
district superintendents to upgrade their overall EOPs to provide updated planning and 
training for a crisis. While school districts are known for their collaborative practices, 
using that skill to work with other districts to plan would allow for a more fluid EOP to 
be created using the four phases of crisis planning. This collaborative work often occurs 
at Regional Education Service Centers. These centers of expertise serve as a basis for 
developing educational capacity, supporting curriculum coordination, and facilitating 
links with policymakers (Fadeeva and Mochizuki, 2007). Monthly regional meetings 
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with other superintendents occur at the regional service centers in Texas. These centers 
are funded through the legislature to provide support to school districts. This is 
especially true in smaller, rural districts that do not have the same level of personnel 
support. The meetings provide opportunities for superintendents to receive professional 
development. Currently, these meetings tend to focus on accountability, special 
populations, and human resources. Including crisis management within their constructs 
would provide needed support for all districts to gain a better understanding of how to 
improve upon the safety and security across all school districts.  
No longer can districts write a plan and then assume that staff know how to 
respond by reading it or discussing it at back-to-school teacher meetings; instead, safety 
drills should take on a “practice makes perfect” attitude. The more you practice, the 
more you build up the procedural memory in your brain. “Muscle memory” refers to 
memories stored in your brain that are actually a type of procedural memory that can 
help you become very good at something through repetition. Practicing all four phases 
will take time away from student learning, but at a time when mass shootings are 
occurring in multiple public areas, schools do not have a choice. A crisis could occur at 
any time, and districts must prepare, practice, and successfully respond to that crisis in 
order to minimize the loss of life in the event of an active shooter.  
Throughout the interviews and analysis of the emergency operation plans, the 
first reaction of the researcher was the most prepared school district was the one with the 
most detailed emergency plan. However, once all information was gathered and the 
researcher was able to dig deeper into the conversations of each superintendent, 
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something else came to the forefront.  In an emergency situation there is no guarantee 
that a detailed emergency plan will save more lives. Instead we have to acknowledge 
that just because a plan is more detailed or inclusive of all four components suggest by 
the United States Department of Education (2007) in the Cycle of Crisis Planning, there 
is no guarantee the plan is better than the others. Ultimately it depends of many factors 
besides the actual plan. Some of those factors include implementation of the plan, the 
response time of first responders, the response of the staff, and even the time of the 
crisis.  In other words, a crisis with staff who are not trained properly may fail; should 
first responders not arrive in a timely fashion, the plan may fail; should the crisis occur 
at a time of day when a large number of students are outside, the plan may 
fail.  Realizing that outside factors have just as much emphasis on the success or failure 
of an emergency plan highlights again that there is no guarantee that more is better when 
dealing with the lives of children in a crisis situation. 
To conclude with a recap of a comment made by one of the superintendents, 
“priorities change as the times change” (personal communication, October 19, 2016).  In 
other words, mandates from the state, new procedures or policies put in place, improving 
the EOP of the district, and a sense of urgency will change as each a new crisis occurs in 
schools.  
Recommendations 
After analyzing the results from this study, the researcher uncovered areas that 
need to be researched as school districts work to improve safety and security of students 
and staff. These recommendations for future research address areas where no previous 
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research was found in the areas of multijurisdictional emergency personnel and teachers 
as first responders. Other recommendations extend current research on crisis planning 
and rural school support. 
The recommendation where research is plentiful is in crisis planning. Research is 
available on having an EOP in place. Gaustad (1991) stated that every district should 
prepare for the possibility of a crisis through planning. The United States Department of 
Education (2007) created the Cycle of Crisis Planning (Figure 1) to show school districts 
how the process should be a continual, fluid process. In later years, documentation on 
preparing a high-quality EOP was shared with states from the United States Department 
of Education (2013), as well as numerous developmental charts throughout the years to 
improve upon crisis planning.  
With all the information available, crisis planning is still in need of reform. This 
was brought to the forefront during an analysis of the EOPs for the four districts. The 
concern raised continues to be how to better prepare the schools. Two areas stand out as 
needing more research: the recovery phase and policy reform. The recovery phase 
specifically refers to the reunification of students to parents in the event of an active 
shooter. After Columbine, information getting to the parents, as well as reunifying 
students to their parents, happened slowly (Columbine Review Commission, 2001). 
Eighteen years later, this is still a concern. The other area where more research is needed 
applies to changing the deep structure of crisis planning according to PET. According to 
Gersick (1991), the only way to change the deep structure of crisis planning would be 
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through policy reform. In order to reform policy, research of best practices across the 
United States would need to occur.  
The next recommendation for future research is in the area of rural school 
districts. Research is needed to look at how smaller districts can provide the highest level 
of security without the same financial means as larger districts. Some areas of this 
research are obvious—smaller districts have fewer staff members to participate in the 
planning and no dedicated security personnel, and funding is based on the number of 
students, meaning less money. So often rural school districts struggle financially, and 
security measures are extremely costly; examples include security cameras, radios, 
SROs, and the addition of safety vestibules in the schools.  
In the overall financial realm of school finance, research on legislation increasing 
or reducing funding to school districts in an inequitable manner should be prioritized. 
This includes but is not limited to school funding and the application of the small-
school-district penalty. Looking specifically at the disparities of per-pupil spending 
through a comparison of small districts and large districts could provide a better 
understanding of how student safety depends on which district a student attends. 
Multijurisdiction is another area where research is needed. Multijurisdiction 
refers to school districts residing in more than one city and/or county. One school in the 
district could be located within the city limits, which would send any emergency call to 
the city police or city fire department. Another school in the same district could be 
located outside city limits, which would have the emergency call going to the county 
police and county fire department. There are other scenarios regarding 
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multijurisdictional status, such as a school district being located within two counties, a 
school district within two city limits, and other combinations that would result in 
multiple calls to first responders. While jurisdictional issues among cities is common, no 
research was found in relation to emergency personnel in different jurisdictions 
responding to a crisis at a school, prompting the recommendation to find ways for 
districts to use the same first responders for all schools within a district without putting a 
financial burden on the smaller districts.  
The final recommendation addresses teachers’ roles in crisis planning. As 
teachers are often the true first responders in a crisis, teachers need to be involved in the 
crisis planning process. A case study of teachers who have been involved in a crisis 
situation would provide detailed information to help in the overall planning process for 
school districts. Current research about teachers’ actions in a crisis have been reported in 
legal reports, but lack the perceptions of the teachers themselves (Columbine Review 
Commission, 2001; Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015). The perspective of 
teachers who have been in midst of a crisis is the only way to learn what else schools can 
do to improve safety in an active shooter situation. 
Conclusion 
 This study is one of few to base research on the four stages of crisis planning for 
a school district: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Four school districts 
consisting of different sizes give a sample representation of what would be seen across 
the State of Texas should this study be replicated in other school districts. This refers 
back to Hatch’s and Cunliffe’s (2006) idea that since truth is universal, the 
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representative sample will provide an indication on how other schools in similar 
situations would respond to the same interview. Looking specifically at the 
superintendents’ perceptions allows for a view from the top. Ultimately, the 
superintendent is responsible for the entire school district in keeping students and staff 
safe, as well as finding ways to provide safety measures requiring financial 
considerations. This study is also the only one to date that triangulates financial data and 
the district EOP with views from the superintendent. 
 So, to what extent are schools prepared to address intruders and active shooters 
through the four stages of crisis planning? Schools are doing the best they can with what 
they have. Is there room for improvement? Yes. No one knew that schools would 
become a place of such heinous violence. Teachers became educators to teach children, 
not knowing that with the change in times, they would many times be considered the 
true first responder to a massacre. The goal is for this study to provide a basis for more 
research on safety in our schools in a time when public shootings are becoming a more 
common occurrence. As Gersick (1991) pointed out, waiting for a change in deep 
structures of a school through an active shooting is not the time to improve upon the 
safety plans or security provided for our students and staff—at that point it is too late.  
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APPENDIX A 
SUPERINTENDENT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Mitigation refers to actions taken to reduce the loss of life and property by lessening 
the impact of incidents and disasters.  
1. Please discuss by title, department and/or organization all those involved in the 
creation of your district Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan? What was 
each person’s role? 
 
Preparedness refers to  actions taken that involve a combination of planning, 
resources, training, exercising and organizing to build , sustain, and improve 
operational capabilities. 
2. Besides training of campus personnel, who else is trained within your 
organization? Explain the training that occurs as well as the time frame. 
 
3. For instructional and non-instructional facilities, explain how active shooter drills 
are practiced? How does the district monitor the completion of drills as well as 
provide feedback? Are any first responders included in the drills, if so, how? 
   
Response refers to immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the 
environment, and meet basic human needs. 
4. Is all or a portion of the district Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan shared 
with any of the following? What is their role in the plan? 
Local law enforcement 
 115 
 
Fire Department 
Local Health Department 
Local Hospital  
Any other please list 
 
Recovery refers to actions taken to restore the learning environment and support 
functions 
5. Explain your district process for after action reviews of incidents or drills 
6. Explain your plan for students after a crisis 
 
Finance 
7. What have been your most costly security measures put in place? 
Have there been any security measures your district wanted to put in place that 
were not implemented due to finances? If answer is yes, please explain. 
8. Has the Board of Trustees requested specific security measures above and 
beyond what the administration has recommended? If yes, please list. 
 
9. What percentage of your current budget is set aside for security? Are there other 
accounts used for security within your budget? 
 
Security Measures 
10. Do you employee a School Resource Officer? If the answer is no, what would be 
the average response time from the closest law enforcement to a secondary 
campus; elementary campus 
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APPENDIX B 
SAFETY PROGRAM/RISK MANAGEMENT EMERGENCY PLANS 
CKC(LEGAL) 
 
EMERGENCY OPERATION PLAN 
 
The District shall adopt and implement a multihazard emergency operations plan for use 
in the District’s facilities.  The plan must address mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery as defined by the Commissioner in conjunction with the governor’s office of 
homeland security.  The plan must provide for: 
1. District employee training in responding to an emergency;  
2. Mandatory school drills and exercises to prepare District students and employees 
for responding to an emergency; 
3. Measures to ensure coordination with the Texas Department of State Health 
Services (TDSHS) and local emergency management agencies, law enforcement, 
health departments, and fire departments in the event of an emergency; and 
4. The implementation of a required safety and security audit [see CK]. 
TRAIN DERAILMENT 
The District shall include in its multihazard emergency operations plan a policy for 
responding to a train derailment near a District school.  The District is only required to 
adopt the policy if a District school is located within 1,000 yards of a railroad track, as 
measured from any point on the school’s real property boundary line.  The District may 
use any available community resources in developing the policy. 
DISCLOSURE 
A document relating to a school multihazard emergency operations plan is subject to 
disclosure under Government Code Chapter 552 if the document enables a person to: 
1. Verify that the District has established a plan and determine the agencies involved 
in the development of the plan and the agencies coordinating with the District to 
respond to an emergency, including TDSHS, local emergency services agencies, 
law enforcement agencies, health departments, and fire departments; 
2. Verify that the District’s plan was reviewed within the last 12 months and 
determine the specific review dates; 
3. Verify that the plan addresses the four phases of emergency management listed at 
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN; 
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4. Verify that District employees have been trained to respond to an emergency and 
determine the types of training, the number of employees trained, and the person 
conducting the training; 
5. Verify that each campus in the District has conducted mandatory emergency drills 
and exercises in accordance with the plan and determine the frequency of the drills; 
6. Verify that the District has established a plan for responding to a train derailment if 
required [see TRAIN DERAILMENT]; 
7. Verify that the District has completed a safety and security audit and determine the 
date the audit was conducted, the person conducting the audit, and the date the 
District presented the results of the audit to the Board; 
8. Verify that the District has addressed any recommendations by the Board for 
improvement of the plan and determine the District’s progress within the last 12 
months; and 
9. Verify that the District has established a visitor policy and identify the provisions 
governing access to a District building or other District property. 
Education Code 37.108(a), (c-2)–(d) 
[See GRC for emergency management training requirements and response to requests 
from other governmental entities for mutual aid] 
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APPENDIX C 
SAFETY PROGRAM/RISK MANAGEMENT EMERGENCY PLANS 
CKC(LOCAL) 
 
EMERGENCY OPERATION PLAN 
The Superintendent shall ensure updating of the District’s Emergency Operations Plan 
and ongoing staff training. 
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APPENDIX D 
SAFETY PROGRAM/RISK MANAGEMENT EMERGENCY PLANS 
CK(LEGAL) 
 
SAFETY AND SECURITY COMMITTEE 
In accordance with guidelines established by the Texas School Safety Center (TxSSC), 
the District shall establish a school safety and security committee.  The committee shall: 
1. Participate on behalf of the District in developing and implementing emergency 
plans consistent with the District multihazard emergency operations plan to ensure 
that the plans reflect specific campus, facility, or support services needs; 
2. Provide the District with any campus, facility, or support services information 
required in connection with a safety and security audit, a safety and security audit 
report, or another report required to be submitted by the District to the TxSSC; and 
3. Review each report required to be submitted by the District to the TxSSC to ensure 
that the report contains accurate and complete information regarding each campus, 
facility, or support service in accordance with criteria established by the center. 
Education Code 37.109 
SAFETY AND SECURITY AUDIT 
At least once every three years, the District shall conduct a safety and security audit of 
the District’s facilities.  To the extent possible, the District shall follow safety and 
security audit procedures developed by the TxSSC or a comparable public or private 
entity.  The District shall report the results of the safety and security audit to the Board 
and, in the manner required by the TxSSC, to the TxSSC.  Education Code 37.108 (b)–
(c) 
DISCLOSURE 
Except as provided by Education Code 37.108(c-2) regarding certain emergency 
operations plans [see CKC], any document or information collected, developed, or 
produced during a safety and security audit is not subject to disclosure under 
Government Code Chapter 552.  Education Code 37.108(c-1) 
AGREEMENTS 
Each school district that enters into a memorandum of understanding or mutual aid 
agreement addressing issues that affect school safety and security shall, at the TxSSC's 
request, provide the following information to the TxSSC: 
1. The name of each entity with which the District has entered into a memorandum of 
understanding or mutual aid agreement; 
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2. The effective date of each memorandum or agreement; and 
3. A summary of each memorandum or agreement. 
Education Code 37.2121 
 
